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Central bankers wish to ensure worldwide that large-value transfer systems, as a component of the key market infrastructure,
exhibit sufficiently robust levels of operational resilience. We focus on the operational resilience of the Hungarian real time
gross settlement system, known as VIBER. The goal of the research is the quantitative assessment of the ability of the system
to withstand certain types of operational shocks. Systemically important participants are identified and it is argued that they
overlap with endangered participants. An indicative list of participants who might be endangered by a liquidity shock is
compiled by analysing proxies for liquidity risk. We shed light on the capacity of the system to function smoothly in the event
of operational problems by simulating the technical default of one or two systemically important participants in VIBER.
Altogether six plausible scenarios were formed, three entire-day incidents and three incidents involving less time (part-time
incidents). The impact of behavioural reactions of technically non-defaulted participants and the application of existing back-
up procedures are also considered. The disturbance in the payment system was measured by the value of initially not
submitted payments, the value of rejected payments, the total value of queued payments, the maximum queue value, the
average queue length and the settlement delay. By means of gross and net liquidity deficit indicators, liquidity assistance
required to settle all previously rejected transactions is calculated. By comparing the value of unsettled payments with the
value of eligible collaterals in the banks’ balance sheet, we can gain insight into whether the liquidity deficit can be financed
through normal monetary policy operations.
JEL: E50, G10, G21, L10, L14.
Keywords: real-time gross settlement, large-value transfer system, operational risk, shock-absorbing capacity.
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Abstract
A fizetési és elszámolási rendszereket kritikus infrastruktúrának tekinthetjük, hisz a rendszerek nem megfelelõ mûködése ve-
szélyeztetheti a pénzügyi szektor hatékony mûködését, szélsõséges esetben akár a rendszer egészének stabilitást is. Ezért a jegy-
bankok világszerte nagy hangsúlyt helyeznek ezen kritikus infrastruktúrákban rejlõ mûködési kockázatok megfelelõ kezelésé-
re. Tanulmányunkban a hazai valós idejû bruttó elszámolási rendszer (VIBER) résztvevõinek más rendszertagnál (illetve 
-tagoknál) bekövetkezõ mûködési kockázati esemény által kiváltott likviditási sokktûrõ képességét vizsgáltuk meg. A tanul-
mány alapján kirajzolódik, hogy az egyes (elsõsorban nagyforgalmú) résztvevõknél bekövetkezõ mûködési kockázati esemé-
nyek által leginkább érintett szereplõk egybe esnek azokkal a résztvevõkkel, akiknél bekövetkezõ technikai probléma legin-
kább befolyásolhatja a rendszer mûködését. Egész napos és napon belüli incidensek elemzésével vizsgáljuk, hogy miképpen
érinti a VIBER többi szereplõjét, ha egy vagy két nagyforgalmú bank valamely technikai hiba folytán nem képes beküldeni
tranzakcióit. Megnézzük azt is, hogy vajon a VIBER-tagok elegendõ likviditással rendelkeznek-e a bejövõ tételek egy részének
elmaradása esetén is ahhoz, hogy aznapra vonatkozó összes (normál körülmények között tervezett) fizetési kötelezettségük-
nek eleget tegyenek. Összesen hat forgatókönyvet vizsgáltunk: háromszor egész napos, míg további háromszor részleges
kiesést feltételeztünk. A technikai problémával küzdõ résztvevõn kívüli szereplõk esetében bizonyos reakciók (tételek küldé-
sének leállítása), illetve egyes helyettesítõ megoldások (kiválasztott tranzakciók papír-alapú benyújtása és manuális feldolgo-
zása) hatását is elemezzük. A rendszer mûködésében keletkezõ hatásokat különbözõ statisztikai mutatószámokkal mértük, így
például a technikai hibát elszenvedõ résztvevõ által be nem küldött tételekkel, a rendszer által fedezthiány miatt visszautasí-
tott tranzakciókkal, valamint a sorbanálló tételek nagyságával, a sorbanálló tételek maximális értékével, a sorbanállás átlagos
idejével, illetve a késési indikátorral. Egyes forgatókönyvek esetében azt is számszerûsítettük, hogy vajon mennyi pótlólagos
likviditásra lenne az egyes szereplõknek szüksége ahhoz, hogy valamennyi visszautasított tételük teljesülhessen.
Összefoglaló
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1.1  MOTIVATION
The Hungarian real time gross settlement system (Valós Idejû Bruttó Elszámolási Rendszer, hereinafter VIBER) is used mainly
for settling large-value payments. The system can be considered as critical infrastructure for those transactions which assume
settlement in Hungarian forint and the settlement or part of the settlement takes place in VIBER. The transactions include
mainly large-value financial market deals and other time critical payments. The average daily turnover of VIBER accounts for
approximately 10% of the annual GDP of Hungary. Given this scale of activity, if the system is inappropriately designed or
poorly operated, it could expose its participants to risk potentially large enough to threaten their day-to-day business activity.
In extreme cases, the financial soundness of the participants and the stability of the system as a whole might also be
threatened. A smoothly functioning large-value payment system is crucial to the efficiency of the financial markets. Besides
the assurance of financial stability, central bankers have an additional interest in a resilient payment system, as it can play a
pivotal role in the implementation of monetary policy.
1
A disruption to normal payment processing activity could result in the crystallization of liquidity risk. If an operational
problem involving a settlement bank prevents the bank concerned from submitting payments to the system, then liquidity can
accumulate on the defaulter’s account (liquidity sink effect). As the bank is unable to redistribute liquidity in the system by
submitting payments, the liquidity positions of the counterparties are also affected or even threatened. The counterparties
may delay their payments or even worse, due to lack of funds they might become unable to settle their payments. 
Analysing the resilience of VIBER is part of the MNB’s
2
payment systems oversight duties. Act LVIII of 2001 on the MNB
defines as one of the basic tasks of the MNB the development of the payment and settlement systems and monitoring their
activities in order to achieve sound and efficient operation and smooth money circulation (MNB, 2001). In line with this, the
MNB has to assess all risks that might have an impact on the system overseen. If the central bank finds that there is high risk,
it should take steps to eliminate or to lessen it by proper risk management. The main risks include legal, liquidity, credit and
operational risk, which are usually interrelated. Besides interrelations, systemic effects are also relevant when risks in payment
and settlement systems are assessed.
3
Thus, systemic risk captures the fact that the impact of legal, liquidity, credit and/or
operational risk is more widespread.
Accordingly, the goal of the current research is the quantitative assessment of the ability of the system to withstand certain
types of operational shocks. We wish to shed light on the capacity of the system to function smoothly in the event of
operational problems and highlight the mechanisms for mitigating the impact of such problems. 
The paper is organised as follows. As for motivation, we review the recent large-scale operational incidents and then we
elaborate on the importance of contingency arrangements and back-up facilities. The scope of the research is outlined in
Subsection 1.4. Section 2 offers a brief review of previous empirical literature using the same simulation methodology as we
do. Section 3 highlights the stylised facts of operational incidents having occurred in VIBER in the recent past. Section 4
presents the data used and discusses the simulation methodology. In Subsection 4.1 the functioning of RTGS systems in general
and the specific features of VIBER are presented. In Subsection 4.2 the indicators used for describing the operation of an RTGS
system, both under normal circumstances and in distressed periods, are explained. Subsection 4.3 provides a description of the
normal functioning of VIBER. The benchmark case is characterised by usual statistical tools and by specific indicators. Critical
periods of the business day, systemically important participants and endangered participants are also identified. We cluster the
VIBER participants by analysing proxies for liquidity risk to get an indicative list of participants who might be endangered in
1  Introduction
1 Note that, depending on the domestic payment and settlement infrastructure, countries might have different approaches concerning whether they settle their
monetary policy operations in the RTGS or in another system. In Hungary the issuance and the redemption of the two-week MNB bills are settled in VIBER, while the
settlement of other monetary policy operations (except the early redemption of the O/N collateralised loans) are booked in the bank’s own system (called InFoRex).
2 MNB stands for Magyar Nemzeti Bank, the central bank of Hungary, hereinafter MNB.
3 The definition of Bank for International Settlements regards systemic risk as the risk that the failure of a participant to meet its contractual obligations may in turn cause
other participants to default with a chain reaction leading to broader financial difficulties (Kaufman, 1996, pp. 17-18).
the case of liquidity shocks. A simple sensitivity analysis is also carried out to see what happens to participants if they do not
receive some of their incoming funds. The overlap between systemically important participants and endangered participants is
also investigated. In Subsection 4.4 assumptions are reviewed. The scenarios are based on different assumptions in relation to
behavioural reactions of technically non-defaulted participants, the timing and length of operational failures, the number and
list of technically defaulted participants, and the application of existing back-up procedures. The scenarios are hypothetical. We
carry out thought experiments by answering ‘what if’ types of question. Section 5 summarises the simulation results. We
simulated altogether six scenarios, three entire-day incidents and three part-time incidents. The disturbance in the payment
system is measured by the value of initially not submitted payments, the value of rejected payments, the total value of queued
payments, the maximum queue value, the average queue length and the settlement delay. By means of the gross and net liquidity
deficit indicators, we also make an attempt to calculate the additional liquidity that would be required to settle all rejected
transactions (Subsection 5.4). Section 6 compares the simulation results prepared by other central banks with the Hungarian
outcomes. Finally, Section 7 presents the conclusions and highlights the area for further research.
1.2  OPERATIONAL INCIDENTS
The smooth operation of payment and settlement systems assumes the availability of resources (premises, staff, IT equipment,
power, etc.) required for their operation. These resources are exposed to operational risk. They can be endangered by both
internal and external factors which could lead to operational disruption. The spectrum of internal and external factors is
diverse; it includes power outages, disruptions to telecommunication networks, IT failures (software or hardware problems),
natural disasters and terrorist attacks. Resources can be protected by different means (e.g. back-up sites and procedures or, in
the case of outsourcing, by service level agreements). Nevertheless, a considerable amount of money has to be allocated for
their protection. Due to the high variety of operational incidents, the unforeseen nature of such events and the low probability
of large-scale events, the costs can often offset the expected benefits of the protection. 
As a consequence of various international incidents in the recent past, increasing attention has been devoted to business
continuity planning and operational risk management.
The consequences of a power outage on the payment system can be highlighted by analysing the impact of the blackout of 
14-15 August 2003 in the U.S (FBIIC, 2003). On 14 August at approximately 4:11 pm, large areas of the northeast lost power,
including New York City. The two primary retail and wholesale payment system operators were able to quickly switch over
to back-up generators and there was no interruption in their services. However, several depository institutions had to close
all operations because their head offices or operations centres did not have back-up power arrangements or they experienced
some problems with their back-up generators. The 14 August blackout disrupted trading in federal funds. 
The impact of natural disasters could perhaps best be demonstrated by the flood in the tunnels below the Chicago business
districts. On 13 April 1992 the Chicago Board of Trade was shut down completely and resumed trading only at small volume
in subsequent days (Pelant, 1992). 
The damaging role of terrorist attacks can be highlighted by analysing the disturbance in the U.S. financial system after 
11 September 2001 (McAndrews and Potter, 2002; Lacker, 2003). It has been reported that, due to the widespread damage
to property and communication systems in Lower Manhattan, the banks experienced difficulties in making their payments.
The inability of some banks to send payments resulted in an unexpected shortfall of liquidity for other banks. This was
significant, as banks rely heavily on incoming funds to make their own payments. The level and timing of activity on Fedwire
were also severely disturbed. To mitigate the effects of the terrorist attacks, the Federal Reserve supplied abundant liquidity
to the banking system through discount window and open market operations.
The Hungarian real time gross settlement system fortunately has never suffered from any similar large-scale natural disaster
or terrorist attack. The incidents occurring in the recent past had a much smaller impact on the operation of the payment
system. The events either affected the components of the central settlement infrastructure or the participants’ facilities.
The service level of VIBER can be illustrated by the availability ratio. On a yearly basis the system was usually available for
settlement in 99.6 per cent of the business hours (Chart 1). In order to define the weak points of the system and to improve
the service level, the MNB regularly monitors the availability of VIBER.
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The components of the central settlement system are operated by the central bank and its service providers. Reliable statistics
are accessible about the operational incidents affecting these central components. The database of incidents affecting the
central components can be considered as complete. Nevertheless, processing of payments also requires the constant ability of
VIBER participants to send and receive payment messages. However, the technical problems of VIBER participants are not
always reported to the MNB. Exceptions include when the participant asks for the prolongation of operating hours. In this
case the participant is obliged to report to the MNB the reason for the prolongation. In many cases technical problems were
cited as the justification for lengthening. Unfortunately, the database of external failures (incidents affecting the participants)
is not complete, and the sample itself is not representative.
Despite the incomplete database the MNB is aware that in the recent past several serious operational incidents have occurred.
From April 2003 until May 2007 the MNB recorded 71 external incidents (including problems with monitoring facilities or
incidents involving ancillary systems like retail ACH or CSD/SSS), which are evidently far less than the number of real
occurrences. In twenty cases the MNB has information concerning how long those problems lasted. The average length of the
operational problems was 2 hours and 21 minutes, the maximum 5 hours and 50 minutes, and the minimum 14 minutes.
Twenty-six of the 72 cases occurred due to the unavailability of the messaging network, known as SWIFT. In the remainder
of the cases there is no detailed information about the source of the technical problem. Although it is hard to draw any
conclusion from this incomplete database, it is clear that failures arose both at small and at big credit institutions. The incident
database shows that failures happen from time to time. Regardless of the low probability of incidents, once they hit it, they
could have a large impact on functioning of VIBER and its participants. Some of the incidents (credit and debit turnovers)
will be analysed in detail in Section 3.
1.3  CONTINGENCY ARRANGEMENTS AND BACK-UP FACILITIES
Due to recent operational incidents more emphasis is put on national and cross-border strategies related to business
continuity planning and operational risk management. Though there have been a range of controls and procedures in place
to reduce the likelihood of disruption from internal sources of operational risk, they proved to be insufficient in many cases.
By defining critical functions and infrastructures, trading and post-trading infrastructures (covering payments and settlement
systems) have been reviewed. The real time settlement systems (hereinafter RTGS system) were considered as critical
infrastructure. After mapping the infrastructures which play pivotal roles in the society and the economy, the decision
makers set up guidelines, expectations or even standards for business continuity planning and operational risk management
of such critical infrastructures. Those expectations (BoE, 2003; BoE, 2004; BoE, 2005; ECB, 2006 and FED, 2003) usually
include the following:
Chart 1
The availability ratio of VIBER
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• required redundancy of resources essential for the operation of such infrastructures (e.g. the requirement of back-up
facilities),
• conditions of redundancy (e.g. the minimum requirement on the geographic separation of the live and remote sites),
• the regular testing of redundant resources in order to ensure that back-up resources are capable of substituting the primary
resources if the latter experience some problems.
Besides critical infrastructures, critical participants were defined in many cases as well. This is in line with the fact that the
normal functioning of the RTGS system supposes that not only the central settlement processing operates properly but also
the facilities of critical participants.
At the same time, the interrelations of various risk types (e.g. operational and liquidity risks) and the importance of technical
liquidity assistance of the central bank was also pointed out. As the central bank is the residual liquidity provider and the
residual liquidity absorber of the banking system, it should always be aware how an operational incident would influence its
counterparties. The central bank should also be able to judge whether the liquidity effects can be handled within the
framework of the usual operations or it has to act as a lender of last resort.
Despite all the efforts to improve the resilience of the payment infrastructure, it is clear that the risk that normal operations
will be disrupted anyhow cannot be eliminated entirely. As a consequence, it is important to assess how operational risk in
systemically important payment systems could be controlled and mitigated.
1.4  SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH
An operational incident, either historical or hypothetical, can be characterised by two dimensions: by the probability of the
occurrence and by its impact (Chart 2). The probability of the incident can either be estimated from an incident database
covering a long time horizon or from an appropriate theoretical distribution, e.g. by means of extreme value theorem. By
measuring the impact of an operational incident, there is a need to distinguish between first and second round effects. First
round effects can be directly observed in the payment system. Appropriate indicators of the severity of first round effects
include the indicator of payment delay or the volume of unsettled transactions. The analysis is ex post, if the first round effects
are measured by means of historical payment system data. The analysis is forward looking, if the disruption of the system is
measured by means of simulated payment data. Second round effects cannot be directly observed in the payment system.
Second round effects materialise in delaying time-critical payments or other contractual obligations. Besides the severity of
the incidents, the costs related to those incidents should also be estimated. 
After estimating the expected costs of operational incidents in the payment system for the entire economy, we should evaluate
the role of the back-up facilities currently in place. The efficiency and the sufficiency of the currently used back-up facilities
should be analysed. If the currently used back-up options prove to be insufficient, investment decisions related to additional
back-up options should be considered. The investment decision should rely on a detailed cost-benefit analysis. At the same
time, the appropriateness of the payment system design should also be evaluated, and a cost-benefit analysis of the possible
investments should be carried out.
4
In fact, the research carried out can be considered as a first step towards evaluating the ability of the payment system to
withstand certain types of operational shocks. In order to judge adequately the appropriateness of system design from a risk
perspective, further research is needed. We set up hypothetical scenarios for operational incidents and examine how severe
the disruption of the payment system is. Note that the market participants do not doubt the creditworthiness of the institution
in trouble. We do not aim to estimate the probability of operational incidents. If the MNB had a detailed database including
all the operational incidents that occurred over a long time horizon, the database could serve as useful input to estimate the
probability. Moreover, the severity and costs of second round effects are also disregarded; they could only be estimated by
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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4 Two prominent examples of shifts in payment system design include the switch from net to gross systems and the introduction of liquidity saving features in RTGS
systems.
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obtaining information directly from the economic agents. Thus, the in-depth analysis of the probability and severity
dimensions of operational incidents requires further research.
The paper assesses exclusively the severity of first round effects of an operational incident by carrying out an ex post analysis.
Although the interrelation between operational and liquidity risk in an RTGS system is well-known, the impact of operational
risk on liquidity risk depends on many factors which are unique to all systems. These factors include the characteristics of the
payment network (e.g. concentration of turnover), available liquidity, behavioural patterns followed by system participants
(e.g. timing of payments) and payment system design. Previous studies (Kiss–Tanai, 2004; Lublóy, 2006) showed that VIBER
has many specific features that might influence the interrelation between operational and liquidity risks in extreme situations.
In the paper we also make an attempt to assess how much additional liquidity is required to ensure the smooth functioning of
the system in the case of an operational incident. We provide a rough estimate for the additional liquidity need by comparing
the value of unsettled payments with the value of eligible collaterals in the banks’ balance sheet. In this way we can gain insight
into whether the liquidity deficit can be financed in the framework of normal monetary policy operations (usual open market
operations and/or overnight collateralised loans).
5
If not, the central bank might intervene in its lender of last resort role as
the financial stability of the banking system might be threatened.
Chart 2
Operational incidents and the payments system design from the risk perspective
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IN THE PAYMENT SYSTEM
 
5 In Hungary the central bank provides liquidity only against collateral. If one of the participants wishes to take longer term or O/N credit, it has to post additional
collateral if the eligible assets already pledged do not cover the collateral requirement. In Hungary both intraday and monetary policy loans are collateralised.
There are several studies prepared by central banks that assess the affects of various operational failures in RTGS or hybrid
systems.
6
These are reviewed in this section. In RTGS and hybrid systems the transactions are settled immediately when
submitted if there are enough funds to cover the payment. The funds usually consist of the current account balance and the
intraday credit line. The participants have to post collateral to obtain intraday credit. 
For analytical purposes simulations based on historical data are carried out. These experiments operate with the payment
system simulator developed by the Bank of Finland (BoF-PSS) or Banque de France. With their built-in functionalities these
simulators can replicate the functioning of various types of large-value payment systems. The goal of performing the
simulations is to shock the payment system and to see what would have happened if the payment system had experienced an
unanticipated operational incident. The possibility of insolvency is ruled out. The market participants do not doubt the
financial soundness of the institution in trouble; the default is exclusively operational in nature. 
All the studies considered address the question whether the inability of a single participant or multiple participants to submit
payments leads to serious disturbances in the system. For analysing these effects three features of the incident are given: (1)
the set of technically defaulted or affected participants, also named stricken banks; (2) when the incident starts (the timing of
the incidents) and (3) how long it takes (the length of the incidents). These parameters are usually set by searching for the
worst-case scenarios with some constraints (e.g. the length of the incident should be two hours). Besides these features the
severity of the failure depends also on the assumptions related to the liquidity available in the system, the payment system
design (e.g. the existence of back-up procedures) and whether the non-defaulting (or unaffected) participants react to the
incident by applying stop sending rules or adjusting bilateral limits. 
The inability of one or more participants to send payments may cause serious liquidity and settlement problems. The
characteristics of liquidity shortages, unsettled payments, queues and delays can be measured by various indicators.
In general, all studies aim at analysing how operational risk might lead to the crystallization of liquidity risk. However the
studies differ in the parameters of the stylised incidents, the assumptions made on the system design and behavioural reactions
of non-defaulting participants, as well as the indicators measuring the impact of the operational incidents.
2.1  ASSESSING OPERATIONAL RISK IN UNITED KINGDOM’S CHAPS STERLING
(Bedford et al., 2004)
Based on February 2004 data, Bedford et al. (2004) assess the impact of different types of operational incidents that could
affect the United Kingdom’s CHAPS Sterling. The authors examined three shock scenarios: the operational failure of one
settlement bank, multiple settlement banks and the central payment processing infrastructure. Instead of using the actual
liquidity available, the authors used five hypothetical liquidity levels resulting from linear combinations of upper and lower
bounds of liquidity.
7
In the study several assumptions were made concerning the behaviour of the unaffected settlement banks and the timing of the
incident. In the first scenario it was assumed that the unaffected settlement banks do not change their behaviour; they wish
to settle all previously planned transactions. Concerning the timing, it was supposed that the problem could not be sorted out
until the end of the business day. In the second case the settlement banks were not passive economic agents; they stopped
sending payments to the bank experiencing the technical default in ten minutes. The authors aimed to identify the point of
time at which the operational failure of one of the settlement banks would potentially cause the most serious disruption of the
payment activity. In order to determine the potentially most problematic scenarios, the authors introduced the terminology
of the virtual credit balance. The virtual credit balance equalled the sum of the actual balance of the current account plus the
MNB OCCASIONAL PAPERS 75. • 200810
6 Hybrid systems dispose of more advanced liquidity saving features by applying, for example, continuous bilateral or multilateral offsetting or netting. The Paris Net
Settlement (PNS) is a prominent example of hybrid systems.
7 For definitions of lower and upper bounds of liquidity see Subsection 4.2 part b).
2  Previous studies
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gross inflow of funds over the next ten minutes. In the worst-case scenario the authors assumed that the operation failure
occurs when the virtual credit position reaches its maximum for any settlement bank or for the randomly selected settlement
banks, subject to the condition that the failure should occur before 12:00 noon.
8
The system’s shock-absorbing capacity is measured by indicators related to unsettled transactions between unaffected
settlement banks, queuing and delay. Bedford et al. (2004) found that, except in the case of the lower bound of liquidity, the
operational failure of one of the CHAPS Sterling settlement banks did not lead to any significant amount of unsettled
transactions (either in value or volume terms). At the same time, the average queue length and the delays did not increase
significantly. The impact of operational disruption involving three randomly selected settlement banks became significantly
greater than in the scenario of single failure. In this case at the upper bound of liquidity there were no unsettled payments.
As the actual amount of liquidity is typically higher than the upper bound of liquidity, it is claimed that CHAPS Sterling is
able to withstand an operational failure affecting one or multiple settlement banks.
2.2  THE IMPACT OF TECHNICAL DEFAULT OF PAYMENT SYSTEM PARTICIPANTS IN
THE PARIS NET SETTLEMENT (PNS) (Mazars and Woelfel, 2005)
Another prominent study using January 2004 data assesses the impact of a technical default in the French PNS large-value
transfer system. The authors used both actual and hypothetical levels of liquidity. The hypothetical liquidity levels included
the lower bound of liquidity and four other liquidity levels obtained by the linear combinations of the actual and the lower
levels of liquidity. PNS applies bilateral limits. The bilateral limit is the net amount of funds a participant is willing to pay to
another participant before being paid back. The theoretical lower bound of bilateral limits corresponds to the minimum value
of bilateral limits necessary to settle all payments between two banks. The simulations were carried out by the actual limits,
by the theoretical lower bounds and by six other hypothetical values in between.
Mazars and Woelfel (2005) analyse the impact of the technical default of the largest debtor, defined as the participant with
the highest value of total payments. The technical default occurs at the opening of the system and lasts for the entire day. In
the simulations it is assumed that the submitting behaviour of the initially unaffected participants is unchanged and the
participants do not adjust their liquidity levels. Nevertheless, the settlement banks are not totally passive economic agents
across all scenarios. In certain simulations the settlement banks could change their bilateral limits vis-à-vis the defaulter and
set them at their theoretical lower bound. On the one hand, this behaviour decreases liquidity flows to the defaulter, while
on the other it ensures that all payments to the defaulter could be settled if the latter were also able to submit payments.
The metrics used to describe the impact of the default on the overall functioning of PNS overlap with the indicators used by
Bedford et al. (2004). The authors found that PNS could function smoothly with significantly lower liquidity levels and
bilateral limits than their actual values. However, if a major participant is unable to submit payment orders to the system, it
could result in almost 10% of payments being unsettled among participants not affected by the technical incident. At the same
time, the technical default leads to a considerable increase in the delay indicator, almost doubling it. In the study it is argued
that contagion effects can be mitigated if the participants lower their bilateral sender limits vis-à-vis the defaulter shortly after
the operational incident. The authors concluded that lower bilateral limits reduced the liquidity loss in the event of default,
while having an insignificant impact if the system operates normally.
2.3  OPERATIONAL RISK ANALYSIS OF THE AUSTRIAN ARTIS (Schmitz et al., 2006)
Schmitz et al. (2006) also operate with real transaction data (recorded in November 2004) to quantify the contagion effect
of an operational incident at one of the participants in ARTIS on the other participants of the system. The liquidity data used
corresponds to actual statistics and disregard the possibility of adjustment by posting extra collateral when the incident
happens.
8 Measuring the liquidity sink effect by the virtual credit balance is not feasible in Hungary as minimum reserve requirements are in place. In the recent past in the
toolkit of the Bank of England’s monetary policy operations there was no minimum reserve requirement, thus the authors could assume that the end-of-day balance
of the RTGS participants should be close to zero. If minimum reserve requirements are in place, the participants would not necessarily aim at disposing of zero balance
at the end of the day. Thus, in this case it could not be assumed that the virtual credit balance equals the liquidity sink effect. Recently, the Bank of England has also
introduced a reserve requirement regime with voluntary participation.
In the simulations operational incidents happen to one or more participants. Schmitz et al. (2006) examined the effect of the
operational failure of the most active participants. The most active participants were defined on the basis of liquidity and
payment concentration. The authors assumed that the participants are incapacitated by a technical problem for the entire
business day. In the simulations various assumptions were made concerning ‘stop sending’ behaviour and the usage of back-up
procedures (debt-authorization
9
or paper-based submission). It was supposed that effective business continuity arrangements
are in place and back-up options are employed before the closure of the system.
10
In the first scenario the most active participant could not submit payments to the system. In the initial setup the 45-minute
stop sending rule was taken into account, then it was disregarded. In the second scenario the most active bank was affected
by the technical problem and the debit authorisation was introduced (no stop sending rule was taken into account). Later, the
debit authorisation was neglected. In the third scenario the three most active banks simultaneously could not submit payments
to the system. At first, all three stricken banks granted debit authorisation to a number of other ARTIS participants. Secondly
the simulations were re-run without the feature of debit authorisation (no stop sending rule was taken into account). 
Schmitz et al. (2006) used several metrics to describe the impact of the technical default on the payment system as a whole
and on individual banks. Among others, the indicators included the liquidity drain and sink effect, and the value and number
of payments unsettled. In the study the lower and the upper bounds of additional liquidity that would be required to settle
all transactions were also calculated. The authors concluded that the contagion effect in ARTIS was low, on condition that
the existing business continuity arrangements prove effective. However, without the use or effective implementation of
business continuity arrangements, the contagion effect on the smooth functioning of the payment system is significant. The
stop sending rule reduced the disturbance in the payment system notably. The debit authorisation also attenuated the system’s
reaction to operational shocks, but to a much lesser extent. 
2.4  THE CASE OF THE DANISH KRONOS (Bech and Soramäki, 2005)
The study of Bech and Soramäki (2005) evaluates the performance of gridlock resolution algorithms under both normal
operating conditions and failure scenarios. The data used to test the effectiveness of the gridlock resolution mechanism under
failure scenarios consists of actual payments settled in the Danish RTGS system. In the operational failure scenario the largest
bank became unable to send payments. The connection recovers only in the last opening hour of the system. The liquidity
available for banks equalled the upper bound of liquidity. In the first simulation setup the authors assumed that the banks
were not aware of the failure and continued sending payments to the failing bank. In the second setup unaffected banks were
reluctant to keep on sending payments and set lower priority to payments to the failing bank. In this way the payments
between non-failing banks could be settled more smoothly.
Bech and Soramäki (2005) found that, in the absence of behavioural response, the recycling of liquidity in the system was
severely damaged, which can be explained by the fact that a large proportion of liquidity is trapped on the failing bank’s
account until the last hour. When the banks took countermeasures, delay slightly decreased. When gridlock resolution
algorithm was applied, settlement delays reduced significantly.
2.5  THE OPERATION OF THE NORWEGIAN NBO WITH DIFFERENT LIQUIDITY LEVELS
(Enge and Øverli, 2006)
The study of Enge and Øverli (2006) measures the resilience of the NBO (the Norges Bank’s real time large-value settlement
system) by varying the liquidity levels. The settlement data covers a 10-day period from October 2005. In the simulations
actual and hypothetical liquidity levels were used. The hypothetical levels of liquidity were obtained by reducing the actual
level of liquidity step by step by 10%.
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9 If the stricken bank grants debit authorisation for a number of other participants, then many payments by the stricken bank could be submitted via the participants
to whom debit authorisation was granted.
10 In this case it was assumed that the internal systems of the stricken banks work properly and thus those banks have up-to-date information about their payment
obligations.
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Enge and Øverli (2006) addressed the question of how changes in actual liquidity available for participants influence the speed
at which payments can be settled, or whether they can be settled at all. In the simulations the authors assumed that, despite
the constrained liquidity, the transaction flows and the settlement behaviour are unchanged. The disturbance of the system
caused by liquidity reduction is measured by three indicators on delays, unsettled transactions and settlement time. The
authors found empirical evidence about the trade-off between the liquidity levels and payment delay in the Norwegian
interbank settlement systems. It was shown that the shock-absorbing capacity of the system is high and that liquidity must be
reduced substantially before considerable settlement delays occur.
In this section some of the operational incidents occurring in VIBER in the recent past are outlined and briefly analysed. The
aim of this section is twofold. Firstly, we would like to provide an insight into the disruption and regeneration of payment
flows on problematic days. Secondly, we would like to partly support the formulation of our hypothetical operational incident
scenarios (Subsection 5.2).
In the period January 2005 – October 2007 there were altogether 17 reported incidents that affected one of the six
systemically important banks.
11
(For definition of systemically important banks see Subsection 4.3.2.) Of the 17 incidents we
explore only those which are relevant for this study. Consequently, we exclude from the analysis all incidents affecting
participants with lower turnover, as we are interested in the disturbance of the payment system in the worst case. In addition,
two incidents occurred on Saturdays which were official working days in Hungary, but not in Europe or in the United States.
As a consequence, the turnover of VIBER was significantly lower than usual; the turnover on these Saturdays equalled around
one fifth and one fourteenth of the average turnover of that month. Additionally, there were four incidents where we were
not able to identify properly their beginning and their end. The banks reported technical problems on these days, but the
maximum gaps in the time stamps of the settled transactions were around 30 minutes, and these occurred several times during
the day. Finally, we ended up with 11 incidents to be analysed in detail.
The analysis of the operational incidents has several drawbacks. First of all, we do not have the receipt times (the actual times
when the transactions were received by the system) at our disposal. As a second best solution we have used the time stamp of
the transactions when they were settled. In this way our analysis is biased.
12
Secondly, in the majority of cases we do not have
any exact information about the beginning and the end of the incidents (the reports of the participants usually contain many
missing data). To overcome this problem, we looked for the maximum in the time gaps of settled transactions. The period
with the maximum length in which there were no executed transactions was considered as the period of the incident.
13
Mandated payments
14
were excluded from our analysis; these payments were submitted even in the case of the technical
default of the participants. For the rest of the payments (bank-to-bank and customer payments, payments initiated via paper-
based back-up and processed by the MNB) we cumulated the credit and the debit turnover of the bank under distress over a
time period of five minutes, and we plotted these cumulative turnovers on a graph. To be able to compare the distribution of
payments over time in the distressed period with the distribution of payments in normal times, we also created a benchmark
period. The benchmark period included the working days of the month before and after the incident. For example, if the
incident occurred on 14 March then the benchmark period corresponded to a period between 14 February and 14 April,
excluding the day of the technical default. For the benchmark period the average turnover data were computed.
15
From the 11 analysed incidents, five lasted for less then two hours. As the incidents were fairly short, they had no real impact
on the process of the payment flows. Interestingly, on the day of the incidents the debit and the credit turnovers were
generally (4 times out of the 5) higher than the average of the benchmark period. Chart 3 demonstrates the payments flows
on a problematic day and in the benchmark period if a short incident occurred. As shown in the chart, on the day of the
incident the turnover was higher than the average of the benchmark period. It is also observable that on the day of the incident
the sending of payments proceeds in ‘blocks’, and when the bank manages to sort out the source of the problem there is a
jump in the value of posted transactions. (It is important to note that in the benchmark period the sending of payments also
MNB OCCASIONAL PAPERS 75. • 200814
3  Stylised facts
11 Apart from reporting, another way of identifying the historical disruptions at participants would involve analysis of the time stamp gaps for sending (time between
sequential payments). This would require the definition of the length of the time stamp gap (threshold), which might be already considered as ‘a disruption’. This
exercise is not easy, especially not for those participants who do not send payments continuously through the RTGS. For those participants whose sending is usually
continuous, this exercise would be easier. Nevertheless, several complications might arise.
12 It is obvious that there might be some delays between sending and settling times due to insufficient funds.
13 Nevertheless, there were some cases where the exact timing of the incident could not have been identified even by this method. As was stated previously, these
incidents were excluded from the analysis.
14 For definition of mandated payments see Subsection 4.3.1.
15 This method has some disadvantages as it assumes that the symmetric two-month period around the date of the incident can be considered as normal. However,
there might be specific factors affecting the daily turnover (EU or US holidays, seasonality of certain types of payment, etc.). The optimal solution would be to estimate
the potential daily turnover on the distressed day and then compare this estimation with the actual data.
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proceeds in ‘blocks’.
16
Nevertheless, we have constructed averages over two months and these blocks disappear.) Then the
receipt of payments (credit turnover) is more balanced and we can observe only smaller jumps in the cumulative credit
turnover balance.
Chart 4 shows the cumulative debit and credit turnover in the case of incidents affecting three different banks for a long
period of time. In case A the incident lasted for 5 hours and 25 minutes; it started at 11:07 and ended at 16:32. Most probably
the bank under distress sorted out the problem even later, as the bank submitted all its transactions at the end of the day by
using the paper-based back-up facility. As shown in the chart, no transactions were booked for almost five and a half hours.
Nevertheless, when the bank started to send its payment orders via fax, in less then one hour the debit turnover became even
higher than the average of the benchmark period. By examining the cumulative incoming payment flows we might conclude
that, despite the long incident, the payment habits of the counterparties were the same both on the day of the incident and
in the benchmark period. The only difference is that on the day of the incident even more transactions are settled at the end
of the day.
17
Chart 4B demonstrates the cumulative debit and credit turnover in the case of an incident that lasted for 6 hours and 13
minutes. The bank was not able to send transactions after 10:14; after this point in time the first transaction was settled at
16:27, most probably by means of back-up options. As shown in Chart 4B, when the bank started to use its back-up facilities,
there was a significant jump in the debit turnover, and finally the debit turnover became higher on the day of the incident
than the average of the benchmark period. The cumulative credit turnover was more or less the same on the day of the
incident as the average of the benchmark period. This may refer to the fact that, despite the disturbance in the payment flows
from the side of the bank under distress, the counterparties did not change their settlement behaviour.
Chart 4C shows an almost entire-day incident; the length of the incident equalled 7 hours and 50 minutes. A couple of
transactions were settled at the beginning of the day. Nevertheless, these transactions were mainly of smaller value, and most
probably they were warehoused. On the day of the incident the first ‘normal’ transaction was booked at 15:43. Although the
technical problem was sorted out very close to the end of the day, the bank finally managed to send and settle 235 transactions
in around one hour. The value of transactions settled up to the closure of the system was slightly (3.35%) higher on the day
of the incident than the average of the benchmark period. Looking at the chart giving cumulative credit turnover we might
conclude that the counterparties send their payments continuously during the day; it seems that they do not withhold
payments from the bank under distress. It is also observable that until 16:20 the turnover in the benchmark period is higher,
which situation changes after 16:25.
Chart 3
Short incidents – payment flows on the day of the incident and in the benchmark period
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16 Sending is never perfectly continuous.
17 This might be explained the fact that the incident occurred at the end of the minimum reserve requirement period, when achieving the required liquidity positions
might result in more transactions at the end of the day. This again shows that it would be better to compare the incident data with an estimated turnover data, which
could take into account several specific factors affecting the daily turnover.
In the following an incident occurring during the forenoon is analysed in more detail. As demonstrated in Chart 5, the
incident started at the beginning of the day and ended at 11:18. Thus, there was a morning incident, which lasted for 3 hours
and 18 minutes. As shown by the chart, the debit turnover recovers in one hour after sorting out the technical problem. It is
also shown that on the day of the incident the turnover is significantly higher (31.78%) than the average of the benchmark
period. If we take a look at the cumulative credit turnover two important observations can be made. Firstly, on the day of the
incident the counterparties send payment orders as they usually do, even at the beginning of the business day when the
technical problem arose. Secondly, the credit turnover increases significantly at 10:35, forty minutes before the end of the
incident.
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Chart 4
Long incidents – payment flows on the day of the incident and in the benchmark period
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A) Incident with duration of 5 hours, 24 minutes
B) Incident with duration of 6 hours, 13 minutes
C) Incident with duration of 7 hours, 50 minutes
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Finally, a four-hour incident is analysed in detail (Chart 6). The technical problem arose at 11:29 and ended at 15:22, thus
it lasted for almost four hours (3 hours, 53 minutes). Both the credit and debit turnover was significantly (35-40%) lower
than the benchmark average. Not surprisingly, there is a jump in the cumulative debit turnover after the problem was sorted
out. There is also a jump in the cumulative credit turnover. Nevertheless, the jump occurs at 14:55, half an hour before the
technical problem was solved.
Though the above sample of examined incidents cannot be considered as comprehensive, it can be seen that the impact
depends on many factors. In many cases we found that the turnover (both credit and debit) recovered after the incident, which
was sometimes the result of applying paper-based back-up solutions. There was an example when the turnover did not recover
at all (Chart 6). We defined ‘recovery’ in terms of whether the turnover (both debit and credit) reached the benchmark level
after the disruption was sorted out. The benchmark was determined as the average daily turnover within a two-month period
(which was symmetric around the date of the incident). This obviously has some drawbacks, just as other methods could have
had (since we do not know exactly how the turnover would have evolved without the incident, we have to estimate it
somehow). Nevertheless, by conducting this analysis it became clear that in real life entirely general assumptions cannot be
drawn. There is usually a hump in the debit turnover after the incident was sorted out, but it is not that sudden (‘recovery’
requires some time, i.e. 30 minutes). It can be shown as well that in some cases a few transactions were stuck in the system
somewhere, and when the problem is solved those overtake the payments initiated after the disruptions. When reality is
replicated by means of assumptions, one has to pay attention not only to possible counterparty responses but also to the
operation of the system elements.
Chart 5
Morning incident – payment flows on the day of the incident and in the benchmark period
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Chart 6
4-hour incident – payment flows on the day of the incident and in the benchmark period
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In this paper the operation of VIBER is analysed with the help of the simulator developed by the Bank of Finland (BoF-PSS).
The simulations are conducted under normal (benchmark case or reference scenario) and distressed periods using actual data
on payments and liquidity from the period December 2006 – January 2007 (equalling to 41 business days). The reference
scenario replicates the actual functioning of VIBER. The institutional features of VIBER are reflected in the parameterization
of the BoF-PSS2.
4.1  ABOUT RTGS SYSTEMS WITH SPECIAL FOCUS ON VIBER
Like CHAPS Sterling, ARTIS, KRONOS or NBO, the Hungarian VIBER is an RTGS system, in which the moments of clearing
and settlement are not separated in time; booking is managed item by item continuously and in real time. The processing of
payment orders and their final settlement takes place continuously, while the participants concerned are notified in real time.
Each settlement takes place by examining whether the participant has provided sufficient liquidity. If so, the payment orders
are settled immediately. If the participant does not have sufficient liquidity, the payment will be placed in the central queue.
There is one queue per account that contains validated payments waiting for settlement. When entries are placed in the
payment queue, they are inserted in FIFO (first in first out) order by priority, which latter is provided by the submitter.
Payments with high priority are always queued nearer the front of the queue than those with lower priority. If the payment
at the head of the queue cannot be settled due to insufficient cover, the queue is blocked. The situation is called gridlock if
the queued payments could be settled by taking incoming payments in addition to the available liquidity into account. In the
opposite case the situation is called deadlock. VIBER has a built-in feature (gridlock resolution algorithm) which solves
gridlock situations on a multilateral basis. In VIBER gridlock resolution can be initiated manually by the central bank at the
request of the submitter. At the same time it can be initiated automatically at a pre-defined frequency. In the current setup
the gridlock resolution algorithm is initiated every 30 minutes. The algorithm works by selecting a set of payments and
attempting to settle them together. Each attempt to settle either succeeds as a complete unit, or fails. If the attempt succeeds,
the algorithm has completed successfully. If the attempt fails, a smaller set of payments is selected and the algorithm is
repeated. The algorithm completes when either a settlement attempt succeeds, or no payments are selected for the next
attempt to settle. Basically the algorithm corresponds to multilateral partial offsetting at a given interval of 30 minutes. During
the business day the payments that have not been settled can be re-prioritised or deleted.
VIBER has direct and indirect membership. At the end of 2006 VIBER had 38 direct participants.
18
The available (or actual)
liquidity of direct participants consists of the current account balance and the intraday credit line, which can be obtained from
the central bank by providing collateral. The list of eligible collateral and the evaluation principles of those assets are
determined by the central bank. Assets eligible as collateral to obtain intraday credit are the same as those accepted in
monetary policy operations. Pledging additional collateral is possible continuously during VIBER business hours.
VIBER provides real time monitoring services. This facility is only used by some of the members. Participants can send
inquiries for information about their payments and accounts via the messaging network. The messaging network of VIBER is
SWIFT.
In order to be able to replicate the functioning of VIBER the following data have been collected:
a) the payments with 
– submission and value dates, time stamps and sequencing parameters that were essential to obtain the submission ranking,
– the amounts, 
– the original priorities and the changes in priorities, 
– the debited and credited banks, and
– the message types defined by the submitter,
MNB OCCASIONAL PAPERS 75. • 200818
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18 The number of the participants remained constant in January 2007.
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b) the initial current account balances and intraday credit lines at the opening of the system and changes of the intraday credit
lines during the day,
c) the system’s open and closure time, and
d) the timing of the gridlock resolution algorithm.
4.2  SPECIFIC INDICATORS USED FOR DESCRIBING THE OPERATION OF AN RTGS
SYSTEM
Besides the usual statistics (turnover and liquidity data, concentration indicators, timing indicators) more specific indicators
were calculated to describe the operation of VIBER by employing the BoF-PSS. It is crucial to understand which kind of
information the specific indicators might provide us. The indicators play an important role in comparing the outcome of the
benchmark case and various stress scenarios. 
a) Non-submitted, rejected and unsettled payments
An obvious indicator of the severity of the operational incident is the number and value of payments initially not submitted
to the system. This direct effect is related to the fact that the operational failure of the settlement bank prevents the bank
concerned sending payment orders.
The risk resulting from the technical default of a participant can be best captured by the rejected payments indicator. The
indicator shows how significant the contagion effect is in terms of number and value of rejected transactions. We refer to
unsettled transactions as the sum of the payments initially not submitted to the system and payments submitted, but due to
insufficient funds rejected.
b) Hypothetical liquidity levels
Besides the actual level of liquidity, there are various hypothetical liquidity levels which could provide useful insight into the
extent to which participants are able to withstand the liquidity risk resulting from an operational incident. 
The lower bound of liquidity equals the minimum amount of liquidity required to settle all payments submitted during a
day. The lower bound of liquidity corresponds to a very extreme case, in which the banks have just enough liquidity to
settle their payments before the end of the day by applying multilateral offsetting as a gridlock resolution algorithm (BoF,
2005). The lower bound of liquidity corresponds either to the net amount of incoming and outgoing payments, or to zero.
In the former case the value of payments sent exceeds the value of payments received, the difference has to be available at
least at the end of the day. In the latter case the inflow of funds is higher than the outflow; the participant exclusively has
to use the liquidity it receives to cover its outgoing payments. The lower bound (LB
i
) of liquidity of participant i can be
written formally as:
(Eq. 1)
where - p
ij
in
is the value of incoming payment j of participant i and
- p
ik
out
is the value of outgoing payment k of participant i.
Thus, the first sum is the value of payments sent, while the second sum is the value of the payments received over the course
of the business day by bank i. On system level the lower bound of liquidity is simply the sum of lower bounds of individual
participants. 
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The upper bound of liquidity corresponds to a liquidity level that a settlement bank would need to obtain in order to settle
its outgoing payments immediately upon their submission. Thus, the upper bound of liquidity is defined as the amount of
liquidity needed to settle transactions without any queues.
Potential liquidity is equivalent to the sum of the current account balance and the hypothetical maximum of the intraday
credit line. The hypothetical maximum of the intraday credit line is based on the data of eligible assets recorded on the
participants’ balance sheet.
19
Unfortunately these figures give only rough estimates as credit institutions can pledge their
securities for other purposes, just like fulfilling collateralization obligations related to stock exchange transactions. Since in
Hungary collaterals are pledged without transferring the title of the securities, we do not have information about how much
of the eligible assets are not accessible if additional collateral would be needed for payment purposes.
c) Liquidity usage indicator
During the business day the outgoing payments are financed by incoming payments and by the available liquidity. The
liquidity usage indicator measures the maximum share of the available liquidity used for financing outgoing payments.
d) Queue and delay statistics
To obtain better insight into the performance of the payment system it is worth analysing the evolution of the queue statistics
(BoF, 2005). The percentage of payments settled in real time – both in volume and value terms – shows the fluidity of the
system. The number and total value of queued transactions show the opposite. In our analysis we focus on the total value of
queued transactions. It should be noted that the indicator is very rough; it does not take into account how large the queue
was at certain points in time and for how long the payments were blocked due to insufficient funds.
The maximum queue and the average queue lengths are two indicators that can complement the total value of queued
transactions. The maximum queue is the peak queue value during the business day. The average queue length is an indicator
that captures the amount of time the payments spent in the queue. The average queue length shows the average queue
duration of queued payments, namely the total queuing time of each payment divided by the total number of queued
payments.
The fourth, fairly complex indicator of the queue statistic that was quantified and analysed is the delay indicator. As this
indicator was quantified in many previous studies, it also serves as a good base for international comparison. The delay
indicator quantifies the extent to which settlement of individual transactions is delayed; actual delay is compared to theoretic
maximum delay at end of day. The delay indicator is a relative indicator ranging from 0 to 1. If no transactions are queued
at all its value is 0. When all transactions are queued until the end of the day its value is 1. The indicator is calculated as the
queuing time weighted value for all queued transactions (transaction value multiplied by the time in queue) divided by the
time weighted value if all payments were delayed to the end of the day. The settlement delay for the entire system can be
written formally as (BoF, 2005):
(Eq. 2)
where – a
i,k
is the value of the payment k of participant i,
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is the submission time of payment k of participant i,
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19 In Hungary there is a detailed report on securities held in the portfolio of credit institutions at the end of the day. The report is submitted to the Hungarian central
securities depository (KELER Ltd.) on a daily basis. In order to calculate the potential liquidity level, security holdings at the end of day were taken into account. It was
assumed that only those assets could have been pledged as collateral during the business day which were at the credit institutions’ own disposal at the end of the
day. By calculating the potential liquidity level of participants, the evaluation policy of the central bank (pricing, haircuts, margins) was also considered. 
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– t
i,k
is the time for final settlement for payment k of participant i, and
– t
end
is the closing time of the payment system.
The delay indicator can be also calculated for individual participants. In this case the first summing operators should be
removed from Equation 2. The value of unsettled transactions is excluded from the queue statistics and thus from the
indicator. The delay indicator shows only the delays for payments that could be settled.
4.3  DESCRIPTION OF NORMAL FUNCTIONING OF VIBER: THE BENCHMARK CASE
Analysis of the benchmark case, that is the normal functioning of VIBER in December 2006 and January 2007, is valuable
for the following reasons:
1. The results of the stress scenarios can be compared with the benchmark case.
2. We can identify critical period(s) of the business day(s) when an incident with a pre-defined length might have the largest
impact on the functioning of VIBER.
3. We can discover the critical participants based on proxies for liquidity risk and concentration indicators. The critical participants
can be either systemically important participants or endangered participants. The technical default of the systemically important
participants might have serious negative consequences on the functioning of VIBER. Endangered participants are institutions
which might be heavily influenced by the operational incidents of the systemically important participants.
We will also analyse whether the systemically important and the endangered participants overlap. Identification of the
systemically important and the endangered participants provides us with a list of potential institutions which might trigger
contagion and which might suffer from the technical default. However, the network structure plays a pivotal role. In order to
gain a proper insight into the interdependencies, simulation exercises are also needed.
4.3.1  General description and critical periods of the business day
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of VIBER for the months December 2006 and January 2007. All submitted payments
were settled by the end of the day; there were no unsettled payments. As demonstrated by Table 1, in December 2006 and
January 2007 on average 3,429 transactions were settled daily. The number of payments settled ranged from 2,098 to 4,963.
The mean value of payments settled totalled 3,496 billion HUF.
VIBER opens at 8:00 a.m. CET and closes at 5:00 p.m. CET. During the analysed period prolongation of the operating hours
occurred three times (once for 15 minutes and twice for 30 minutes). The credit institutions justified their request for
prolongation with reference to technical problems. During the analysed period all the technical problems were sorted out by
the end of the business day and there was no need for submitting payments via fax.
20
In fact these prolongations did not
change the intraday pattern of payments’ submission. Chart 7 shows the distribution of value of submitted payments
according to the system’s receipt time.
Minimum Average Maximum St. dev.
Number settled 2,098 3,429 4,963 585
Number unsettled -   -   -   -   
Value settled (million HUF) 1,422,990 3,496,231 5,387,416 751,756
Value unsettled -   -   -   -
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of VIBER (December 2006–January 2007)
20 If there had been payments submitted via fax, those would have appeared in the underlying data as if they had been initiated by the central bank.
In Chart 7 it can be seen that at the beginning of the business day the slopes of the curves are steeper. This can be explained
by the warehoused payments
21
which are channelled into the central accounting system right after the system is opened. The
payments are submitted to VIBER via various channels. At default the transactions are initiated by the debited bank. However,
there are cases when payments are initiated by someone else. These payments are know as mandated payments and are
initiated, for instance, by the central bank (e.g. settlement of clearing positions of the ancillary systems) or by the CSD/SSS
(e.g. DVP transactions).
22
Mandated payments include the START transfers, the DVP transactions initiated by KELER, the
multinet settlement of stock exchange deals, the settlement of card transactions and cash withdrawals with the central bank,
etc. The extremely steep slope of the curve for payments submitted by the central bank can be explained by the liquidity
adjustment at the beginning of the day.
23
On the basis of Chart 7 we can also conclude that the most active submission period
for payments initiated by the debited banks is between 9:30 and 14:00.
4.3.2  Systemically important participants 
The systemically important institutions in VIBER are identified by means of concentration indicators of the debited banks.
24
The concentration ratios and the Herfindahl-Hirschman indices
25
showed fairly high concentration in the last few years
(Table 2). The chosen reference period shows similar properties. 
Note that CSD stands for central securities depository, SSS for security settlement system and CB for central bank. In Hungary KELER Ltd. fulfils both
the role of the CSD and the role of the SSS.
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21 Warehoused payments are payments submitted before the days of the value date. In VIBER it is possible to send payments five days before the value date. These
warehoused payments are waiting in the internal queue of the central accounting system to be processed on the value date.
22 DVP stands for Delivery versus Payment, which provides a link between a security transfer (settlement) and a funds transfer system to ensure that delivery occurs, if,
and only if, payment occurs.
23 After the closure of the system the final balances are stored in VIBER databases. However, after the closure payments related to, for example, monetary policy,
operations are settled in the central bank’s proprietary system (InFoRex). The business day ends with the closure of InFoRex. After this the retail payment system
(Interbank Clearing System, ICS) settles payments using the liquidity of the credit institutions held at the central bank. Due to the settlement in InFoRex and ICS the
final balances stored in VIBER databases at the end of the business day do not correspond to the real balances at the opening of the next day. The START items are
booked right after the opening of VIBER; it synchronises the balances of VIBER participants in CAS with the balances in InFoRex.
24 As bank-to-bank and customer payments make up the majority of the payments initiated in VIBER, the concentration indicator of the debited bank is a good proxy
for the concentration indicator of the submitters.
25 The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) shows the sum of the squares of the individual banks’ market share expressed in percentage form. The maximum of the index
is 10,000. In that case one market participant owns 100% of the market. According to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the United States, the market is highly
concentrated if the Herfindahl-index is above 1800. The market is moderately concentrated if its HHI is between 1000 and 1800 and the market is not concentrated
if its HHI is under 1000 (1997 Merger…,1997).
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Distribution of value of payments (December 2006–January 2007)
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In our analysis those participants are considered as systemically important institutions which dispose of more than 5% of the
debit turnover in the reference period. In this way we have identified six participants whose technical default might have a
serious impact on the functioning of VIBER.
Similarly to our findings, the study of Lublóy (2006) identified the same systemically important institutions according to
certain network criteria. In the study a graph theoretical framework was applied that provided an ideal tool for identifying
the most active nodes in the network. When the institutions most capable of generating contagion through the Hungarian
large-value payment system were selected, it was taken into account that a liquidity crisis could arise if funds are not
transferred to counterparties, although the counterparties might have expected it. Lublóy (2006) argued that the institutions
most capable of generating contagion can be best captured by means of valued outdegree centrality and out-proximity
centrality. Based on the centrality measures, a well-defined group of institutions was identified; the illiquidity of these
institutions could cause the most serious disruption of the payment system. 
4.3.3  Endangered participants
Participants endangered by the technical default of systemically important members can be identified by assessing the liquidity
risk they face under normal conditions and in distressed periods. In this subsection, as a starting point, we examine various
proxies for liquidity risk under normal functioning and, based on this information, we form clusters with common
characteristics. Based on the clustering, we identify those whose members could be easily endangered in the case of a liquidity
shock. Secondly, as a next step, the circle of these endangered participants is enlarged by means of a simple sensitivity analysis
based on a stress indicator. As a result, we arrive at an indicative list of participants who might be endangered if a systemically
important member technically defaults.
Nowadays it is widely accepted that RTGS systems eliminate credit risk, but introduce liquidity risk in the settlement
procedure. In RTGS systems liquidity risk refers to a situation in which participants do not have enough funds to settle their
payments on time. Liquidity risk in RTGS systems can be estimated by means of various rough proxies. The first indicator
could be whether the members succeeded in settling their payments at least by the end of the day. In RTGS statistics this is
shown by 
• the volume and value of unsettled payments, and by 
• the relation of the lower bound of liquidity to the actual level of liquidity. 
Note that there might be transactions which stay in the banks’ internal queue due to lack of funds. The central bank does not
have information about these queues. 
In addition, even if there are no unsettled payments in the system or in the banks’ internal queues, liquidity risk can emerge
as a result of settlement delays. It depends on the payment whether its urgency requires (almost) immediate settlement or a
certain delay is tolerable. Immediate or almost immediate settlement has its own cost implications. Whether a delay is
HI CR(5) CR(10)
Characteristics of VIBER
April of 2004 1,000 61% 85%
Debit turnover Year of 2006 1,041 63% 85%
Dec. 2006–Jan. 2007 1,002 62% 83%
April of 2004 1,000 61% 86%
Credit turnover Year of 2006 1,042 63% 84%
Dec. 2006–Jan. 2007 1,042 63% 85%
Table 2
Concentration of VIBER credit and debit turnover 
tolerable or not depends on the originator’s preferences concerning immediacy. If the originator does not dispose of enough
funds, the preference relating to the cost of immediacy might be important as well. In the function of these parameters the
credit institutions should decide on timing and prioritizing of payments by having liquidity constraints at the same time. In
RTGS systems it is important to see the trade off between available liquidity and delay. As intraday liquidity is costly for the
member banks, queues and delays can be considered as typical features of RTGS systems. The costs of intraday liquidity
include the opportunity cost of the collateral posted, the transaction cost of intraday credit changes and potential fees or
interest rates related to intraday credit.
26
As we have no information about the time criticality of the payments, the following
statistics can provide proxies for liquidity risk: 
• Quantity of queuing in the system (queue indicators, liquidity usage indicator, relation of the upper bound of liquidity to
the actual level of liquidity)
• Time required to clear the queues in the system (delay indicator, queue length indicator)
• Liquidity buffer of the participants under normal conditions (relation of the upper bound of liquidity to the potential level
of liquidity).
Due to redundancy among the above listed indicators (e.g. between queues, liquidity usage indicator and the ratio of upper
bound and actual level of liquidity) not all of them are analysed thoroughly.
All the indicators can be examined on a system level and on the level of each participant. It is important to stress that system-
level indicators might be favourable, while individual indicators might show high variation. In the following we examine
participant-level indicators and on the basis of these statistics we form groups and identify those clusters which are most prone
to liquidity risk. 
Previously it was noted that in the reference period there were no payments rejected due to lack of funds.
27
The total value of queued transactions expressed as a percentage of value settled equalled 16.41% on average (Table 3); the
maximum was 33.02%. The maximum queue value expressed as a percentage of value settled equalled 4.29% on average.
However, there was a day when the maximum queue value was 11.08% of all the transactions settled. The mean of the
average queue duration of queued payments was 41 minutes. On 19 January 2007, with more than two hours of average
queuing time, the indicator reached its maximum.
In relation to the queue statistics there are significant variations across banks. If we look at the queue statistics in Table 4 in
detail, we can see that five participants are responsible for 97% of the queues (both in number and value). Three out of the
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MNB OCCASIONAL PAPERS 75. • 200824
26 In U.S. the central bank applies fees, for example.
27 In January, May and June 2006 there were some days during which the system had to reject payments at the end of the day due to lack of funds. Analysing the
background of those unsettled payments, it often became clear that participants should have used the built-in functions of VIBER (e.g. gridlock resolution) more
efficiently. In that case the majority of the rejected payments would not have been rejected at the end of the day.
Minimum Average Maximum
Value of payments initially not submitted -   -   -   
Value of unsettled payments                  -   -   -   
Total value of queued transactions (as % of value settled) 2.62% 16.41% 33.02%
Maximum queue value (as % of value settled) 1.35% 4.29% 11.08%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 0:08:34 0:41:24 2:08:44
Settlement delay 0.01 0.07 0.16
Table 3
Queue and delay statistics (December 2006 – January 2007)
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five participants dispose of the highest share in debit turnover. Two participants with the highest proportion of queued
payments queued up 76.22% (number) and 70.28% (value) of their payment orders.
The settlement delay was 0.07 on average (Table 3), the maximum of the delay indicator equalled 0.16. The settlement delay
also varies across banks. There is one small bank whose average settlement delay is outstandingly high compared to other
system participants. The average settlement delay of this small bank equals 0.1895, which is almost 4 times higher than the
average settlement delay of the bank with the second highest settlement delay (0.0478). This phenomenon can be explained
by the specific timing behaviour of the small bank. Namely, the bank sends the majority of its payment orders at the beginning
of the day and waits for the incoming payments. Meanwhile the payment orders are queued up; the average queue length of
the bank is almost 2 hours.
28
The settlement delay of another small bank, which is a subsidiary of a big bank, is nearly the same as the delay of the bank
with the second highest delay which is the most active in the payment system. However, there are striking differences in the
turnover and thus in the value of queued payments. There are five other banks at which the settlement delay is higher than
the average. Two of them are among the most active participants in the payment system. Another two submit their payment
orders to the system as usual, but on some days the banks have to wait fairly long for their incoming payments. If the incoming
CR2 CR3 CR4 CR5
Number of queued transactions 76.22% 88.69% 96.11% 97.38%
Total value of queued payments 70.28% 85.35% 93.94% 97.17%
Table 4
Concentration of queued transactions (December 2006 – January 2007)
28 It is an interesting observation that this small bank is one of the two institutions that changes priority of payments regularly. In Hungary the central bank and the CSD
have dedicated the priority scale from 0 to 9 for their own purposes. The participants might prioritise their transactions from 10 to 98, but they do not make use of
that. They usually use one priority as a default. From 1 December 2006 to 31 May 2006 there were 10 priority changes in the system. Seven out of the 10 priority
changes were initiated by the above-mentioned small bank.
Note: The data of the Hungarian State Treasury (Single Treasury Account, KESZ) were included in the liquidity levels. Filtering the data of the Hungarian
State Treasury out induces changes mainly in the actual level of liquidity, but on the days when the actual level of liquidity is closer to the upper bound,
this change is significantly smaller. 
Chart 8
Lower and upper bounds of liquidity, actual liquidity and potential liquidity (billion HUF)
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
HUF billion
1
 D
e
c.
 0
6
6
 D
e
c.
 0
6
1
1
 D
e
c.
 0
6
1
6
 D
e
c.
 0
6
2
1
. 
D
e
c.
 0
6
2
6
 D
e
c.
 0
6
3
1
 D
e
c.
 0
6
5
 J
a
n
. 
0
7
1
0
 J
a
n
. 
0
7
1
5
 J
a
n
. 
0
7
2
0
 J
a
n
. 
0
7
2
5
 J
a
n
. 
0
7
3
0
 J
a
n
. 
0
7
Lower bound Actual level Upper bound Potential
payments arrive later in the day, payments may stand in a queue for hours. As a consequence, the delay indicator is relatively
high. The fifth bank can be characterised by almost the same payment pattern as that of the small bank which is a subsidiary
of a big bank. As many banks do not have queues at all, or only a few transactions are queued up on certain days, the average
settlement delay of these banks is either 0 or very close to 0.
At aggregate level the system had more than enough liquidity to settle all payments immediately, and the system as a whole
had ample liquidity not posted as collateral. In Chart 8 it can be seen that on the system level the actual level of liquidity in
VIBER is significantly higher than the lower bound. This means that on the system level the payments could be always settled
at least by the end of the day. However, there are significant variations across banks. In distressed periods there might be
institutions at which the liquidity buffer available might not be sufficient to mitigate the impact of a liquidity shock. 
Based on the queue, delay and liquidity indicators, we have formed five clusters. Our results are summarised in Table 5.
Participants in Group ‘A’ have a higher actual level of liquidity than the upper bound of liquidity on most days. As we can
conclude on the basis of Chart 9, participants in Group ‘A’ have recorded queues extremely rarely. The participants are not
prone to liquidity risk, the actual liquidity level already ensures buffer against liquidity risk. Additionally, the participants have
high liquidity buffer in their balance sheets, in case the actual liquidity proves to be insufficient. In Group ‘A’ there are five
credit institutions among the 25 which use their available liquidity more efficiently than the others. This can be explained by
the fact that their share in debit turnover is approximately 14%, which leads to economies of scale and stipulates the
establishment of active payment and liquidity management functions inside the bank.
The remaining 20 institutions in Group ‘A’ have much more actual liquidity than they would need for their payment activity.
This excess liquidity reflects inefficiency from the point of view of the payment system. Credit institutions might hold more
liquidity than their working balances (defined as the liquidity needed for payment purposes) due to the binding nature of
reserve requirements. In addition, the low opportunity cost of eligible assets might also be one reason why credit institutions
post more collateral than they would need for their payment activity. Four out of the 20 institutions are specialised credit
institutions with specific legal requirements concerning their asset holdings. Obviously there is an overlap between assets
eligible in central bank operations and between those held by the specialised credit institutions in line with legal requirements.
As the title of the securities is not transferred during pledging, regardless of the transaction fees, the opportunity cost of
posting them as collateral is zero. Consequently, the share of the intraday credit line in available liquidity is high in the case
of these institutions, even if they do not make use of it. Most probably there are some credit institutions where reserve
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Note: The data of the Hungarian State Treasury (Single Treasury Account, KESZ) were included in the liquidity levels. 
Chart 9
Lower and upper bounds of liquidity, actual liquidity and potential liquidity in Group ‘A’
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requirements are binding and they cannot reduce their current balances. Identification of these institutions requires further
research.
Participants in Group ‘B’ queue up transactions more often, but their balance sheet contains abundant liquidity buffer 
(Chart 10). In the reference period these institutions did not post any collateral. (Interestingly, in April 2006 one of them
already posted collateral). Based on the debit turnover these members are the least active participants, so it might be worthless
to develop sophisticated payment and liquidity management functions. The same holds for Group ‘C’, though their share in
debit turnover is slightly higher.
Group ‘C’ contains those participants which queue up payments more often than participants in Group ‘A’. In the case of liquidity
shocks there might be occasions when potential liquidity is not enough for immediate settlement of payments (Chart 11). We
consider these credit institutions as endangered participants, as they might face problems if there are liquidity shocks. 
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Chart 10
Lower and upper bounds of liquidity, actual liquidity and potential liquidity in Group ‘B’
(average over 3 participants)
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Chart 11
Lower and upper bounds of liquidity, actual liquidity and potential liquidity in Group ‘C’
(average over 3 participants)
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Participants in Group ‘D’ build up queues often and transactions spend quite some time in the queue. The delay indicator is
medium-sized for them. Their balance sheet contains some liquidity buffer (Chart 12). Taking the uncertainty regarding the
proper level of potential liquidity into account, these institutions might easily experience problems if there is a liquidity shock.
We consider these credit institutions as endangered participants. Although two of these participants have high shares in the
debit turnover and the usage of their intraday credit line is high, they do not manage intraday credit line that often. This might
refer to a situation in which banks dispose of two asset portfolios: one is posted as collateral and the other is used for trading
purposes.
The two participants in Group ‘E’ have no liquidity buffer in their balance sheets (Chart 13). Participants in this group dispose
of the highest delay indicator. As was mentioned previously, one of the institutions has a significantly greater indicator.
However, its share in debit turnover is low. The other credit institution is the most active one in VIBER. This institution is
certainly pushed toward a more active payment and liquidity management. This participant manages its intraday credit line
Chart 12
Lower and upper bounds of liquidity, actual liquidity and potential liquidity in Group ‘D’
(average over 3 participants)
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Chart 13
Lower and upper bounds of liquidity, actual liquidity and potential liquidity in Group ‘E’
(average over 2 participants) 
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actively. The relationship between the actual and potential liquidity might refer to the bank’s special attitude toward asset
management. The bank seems to pledge part of its trading portfolio as collateral and if there is a need for a specific asset
which was posted before as collateral the bank releases it.
By means of a simple sensitivity analysis we have examined what happens to VIBER participants if they loose a pre-defined
proportion of their incoming payments. We have measured whether the participants’ eligible asset portfolio would be
sufficient to fulfil the financing role of incoming funds. We varied the loss of incoming payments from 10% to 100%. The
results are summarised in Table 6. The table shows the number of participants encountering problems on at least 25% of the
days in the function of loss of incoming payments. The second row of Table 6 shows, for example, that if the participants do
not receive 50% of their incoming payments scheduled for that day, then 4 additional participants will not be able to fulfil
all of their payment obligations on at least 25% of the days. It is also shown in the table that in this case altogether 11
participants face liquidity problems on at least 25% of the days. 
By varying the loss of incoming payments we found that 15 participants could easily cope with the loss of all incoming
payments, as their balance sheets contain enough buffer of eligible assets. These 15 participants are excluded from Table 6.
As shown in the first row of Table 6, 10 participants would face problems on at least 25% of the business days if they loose
all their incoming transactions. Eleven institutions would face serious problems on at least 25% of the business days if they
do not get at least 50% of their incoming payments. These participants rely heavily on the financing role of incoming
payments. Interestingly, during the clustering we have classified 8 out of these 11 as endangered participants. In line with this
simple sensitivity analysis, we enlarge the group of endangered participants with the three previously not identified
institutions.
4.3.4  Overlap between the systemically important and the endangered
institutions
If we have a look at the list of the systemically important and the endangered institutions there is an overlap between them.
Only one of the systemically important participants is not identified as an endangered institution. This bank has a fairly large
portfolio of eligible assets. The overlap corresponds to the findings on concentration ratios and rank correlation indicators.
The indicators based on the debit and credit turnover showed high concentration. The rank correlation indicators shown in
Table 7 highlight that members having the highest ranks according to their shares in debit turnover are the same as those
having the highest ranks according to their shares in credit turnover. This is in line with the financing role of incoming
payments, which is typical for an RTGS system. The rank correlation indicators demonstrate weaker relationship between the
ranking of debit turnover and available liquidity. Thus, most active participants in VIBER are not necessarily the same as the
institutions with the highest available liquidity.
In sum, the six most active players measured by the debit and credit turnover in VIBER could easily trigger a serious liquidity
shock. On the other hand, these institutions could easily suffer from a liquidity shock if that is caused by a systemically
important member.
These institutions and in many cases their important customers (e.g. large foreign financial institutions for whom domestic
banks are forint correspondents) are active money market participants in the FX swap segment. The recent FX settlement
survey of the central bank (Tanai, 2007) showed that these participants recorded the largest FX settlement risk in the domestic
banking sector. These credit institutions initiate large amount of transactions in VIBER with a relatively small balance sheet.
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Share of loss of incoming payments Number of participants
100% 10 10
50% 4 11
30-40% 2
10-20% 5
Table 6
Number of participants encountering problems
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Should a liquidity shock arise in the system (e.g. due to improper functioning of financial markets or operational incidents),
their balance sheets could easily be a bottleneck. On the one hand, the relatively high velocity of liquidity makes the
institutions vulnerable to unexpected liquidity shocks, but, on the other, refers to extremely efficient payment and liquidity
management practices.
4.4  ASSUMPTIONS BEING MADE IN DIFFERENT STRESS SCENARIOS
In the paper operational failure is defined as the technical problem of one or more system participant, excluding the MNB.
The technically defaulted participants are unable to send and receive payment messages, that is, the participants are unable to
access the SWIFT network. Inability of technically defaulted participants to send and receive payment messages would not
hinder other non-defaulted participants to send payments to the problematic credit institutions. 
The liquidity risk caused by operational disruptions is examined by means of several scenarios. The scenarios are hypothetical
and based on stylised operational failures, though they might not be far from reality. The scenarios are based on different
assumptions in relation to:
• the behavioural reactions of technically non-defaulted participants,
• the timing and length of the operational failures,
• the number and the list of technically defaulted participants, and
• application of existing back-up procedures.
4.4.1  Behavioural reactions of technically non-defaulted participants
In the simulations several behavioural assumptions are made. On the one hand, it is assumed that the behaviour and the
payment pattern of the non-defaulted VIBER participants, regardless of the initial shock, are unaffected. This behavioural
assumption of no reaction has several dimensions. Firstly, it is assumed that the settlement banks wish to settle the same
volume and value of transactions (even to the technically defaulted participant) with the same priority as under normal
business conditions. Secondly, in the model the settlement banks do not raise additional liquidity by borrowing funds from
the mother bank or in the interbank market in order to ensure the settlement of all its payment orders. Based on enquiries
with some Hungarian credit institutions, this behavioural assumption is not far from reality for (already) agreed obligations.
There might be several reasons why banks do not stop sending payments to the stricken bank. Firstly, the technical
infrastructure of the payment systems located in the back offices is very complex. Most of the payment orders are generated
automatically from several internal back office systems as the last step of the straight through processing (STP). As a
consequence, it is not easy to modify the list of payment orders waiting for transmission to the central settlement engine.
Secondly, the banks cannot allow themselves to risk their reputation. If a bank wishes to maintain its high prestige, the bank
should prove that it is able fulfil its contractual commitments, even when it experiences some problems. Thirdly, a contractual
commitment is an obligation, if the bank does not fulfil it, then it should count with the legal and financial consequences. 
On the other hand, in distinct scenarios we assume that the settlement banks are not passive economic agents. Instead they
take actions aimed at preventing the bank under distress from becoming a liquidity sink and they stop sending payments to
the bank experiencing the technical default (stop sending rule). In Section 3 we have identified one out of the 11 analysed
incidents when the turnover did not recover at all, as it did not reach the benchmark level after the disruption was sorted. In
this case the evolution of the credit turnover (see Chart 6) might refer to the application of the stop sending rule. The stop
sending rule implicitly assumes that there is no information asymmetry in relation to the operational incidents and unaffected
April of 2004 Year of 2006 Dec. 2006–Jan. 2007
Between the following indicators
Debit and credit turnover 0.9900 0.9955 0.9927
Debit turnover and average liqudity 0.8100 0.8773 0.8957
Table 7
Rank correlation indicators 
participants are aware of the events affecting the technically defaulted member. However, in real life it usually takes time to
get informed about participants’ technical problems. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a time-lag between a VIBER
participant experiencing an operational failure and the timing of phone calls in which the technically defaulted bank
announces its problems to the MNB. After the announcement the central bank sends a free type SWIFT message to the other
members. It can also happen that, even before the announcement, the intact settlement banks notice that they are not
receiving the expected incoming payments and they wish to know whether the MNB has any information about the source
of the problem at the settlement bank under distress. They usually call the central bank in order to obtain more information.
Empirical evidence suggest that, even if the intact members get fully informed, they usually do not know whether they should
stop sending payments or should continue with them. The central bank usually encourages them to submit their payments.
There is high degree of uncertainty about how much time the elimination of information asymmetry requires. In our
simulations we assume two hours reaction time. To examine scenarios with more efficient alarming systems would not be
feasible. It should also be taken into account that international recommendations on recovery time define a two-hour interval,
in which the institution should be able to sort out the operational problem (i.e. FED, 2003). As a result, the undamaged
participants, even if they are aware of the operational problems in time, might wait two hours until they react by stopping
outgoing payments to the damaged agent. In sum, in our paper the stop sending rule applied in two hours is simulated.
4.4.2  The timing and the length of the operational failures
The timing and length of operational incidents have a large impact on the system’s performance. In one set of simulations the
worst-case scenarios are considered. It is assumed that the operational incident occurs no later than the opening of VIBER
and lasts until the end of the business day (entire day incident). Thus, the technical problem arose no later than 8:00 a.m.
CET and could not be sorted out until 5:00 p.m. CET.
29
We also run simulations where the starting point of the operational failure is not fixed in advance, however the length of the
incident is set at a pre-defined level (part-time incidents). In this case the timing of the operational incident is the outcome of
an optimization routine. We look for an appropriate algorithm to find the worst-case scenario; the operational failure should
arise when it has the largest negative impact on the system.
However, there are some constraints. The severity of the disruption of the payment processing activity can only be large
enough if the banks wish to settle many payments during the rest of the business day. As a consequence, it has no sense to
analyse the impact of an incident that happens close to the end of the business day, as the number of transactions to be settled
is low. The daily cumulative distribution of payment flows showed that in VIBER most payments (80-90% of the turnover)
are settled by 2 p.m. CET (see Chart 7). Thus, it has no sense to let the operational incident occur later than that.
4.4.3  The number and list of technically defaulted participants
Initially it is assumed that a single settlement bank is unable to submit payments to VIBER owing to a failure of its internal
back-office system. The technical problem is isolated; solely a single bank is hit by the shock. As we are interested in the
disturbance of the payment system in the worst case, there is no point in choosing minor participants whose failure would
have insignificant impact on the functioning of VIBER. Thus, we assume that systemically important institutions, which were
identified by means of concentration indicators of the debited banks and certain network criteria, are affected by the technical
problem.
30
In the paper, as we focus on the worst case, we quantify the impact of the first six systemically most important
institutions.
By means of additional scenarios we also quantify the risk implications of operational disruption affecting the ability of
multiple settlement banks to submit payments to VIBER. If we selected two banks randomly from the 38 participants, we
would end up with 703 possible combinations. If we selected three banks randomly we would arrive at 8,436 various
combinations. The modification of the input data and, in the case of a part-time incident, the optimization procedure would
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29 Prolongations mentioned in Subsection 4.3.1 have been taken into account.
30 Note that occasionally it might happen that operational problems at a bank with a relatively lower debit turnover result in a severe disruption of the payment system.
The connectedness of the bank and the unequal distribution of the liquidity might also play a crucial role. Nevertheless, the probability of a small bank generating a
large shock is relatively low.
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take too long for all of these combinations. As a result, we opted for analysing the worst cases and we assumed that the
technical problems hit two of the six systemically most important institutions. This corresponds to 15 possible couples of
banks that are suffering from a technical problem simultaneously. It is important to stress that the probability of this kind of
incident is low.
31
4.4.4  Possible contingency procedures
The functioning of the system in a distressed situation can be enhanced if back-up procedures are in place. In some countries
these contingency procedures usually require time-consuming manual intervention. There exist quicker (mostly electronic)
back-up facilities, but this is not the case in Hungary. We assume that one or more participants cannot submit their payments
via SWIFT, but communicating via fax, which is the back-up for SWIFT, is feasible. The identification of the not-yet-sent
payments, the production of the paper-based credit transfer with all the required data and the submission of the fax to the
central bank requires some time, just like the processing of these fax-based transactions at the central bank.
32
It is important
to note that, due to the fear of duplicating payments, participants hesitate to use back-up options. In order to re-channel the
sunk liquidity from the bank under distress, some central banks apply the so-called stricken bank scheme. In our paper we do
not deal with this possibility.
31 At the same time it would be feasible to assume that ELMA SWIFT suffers from a technical incident. ELMA SWIFT is a concentrator which provides SWIFT connectivity
services for VIBER participants. There are nine banks and savings co-operatives that do not have their own SWIFT interface, but join the interface of ELMA SWIFT and
send payments through this single interface. If this interface is out of order, nine institutions could not submit payments. Nevertheless, the debit turnover of the nine
institutions is very low. As this kind of operational incident would affect the operation of VIBER marginally, it is not analysed.
32 The work at the central bank takes approximately five minutes per transaction. During the simulations we assumed four persons as an average number of staff
members in the VIBER team of the central bank. This means that in one hour the VIBER team is able to process approximately 50 fax-based transactions.
5.1  GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON SIMULATION TECHNIQUES
The technical default of one or more VIBER participants has both direct and indirect effects on the performance of the system.
The direct effect is obvious; the operational failure of the settlement bank prevents the bank concerned submitting payments
to the system. If the problem is severe enough and cannot be fixed before the end of the business day, in the absence of
contingency arrangements the settlement bank under distress will end up with many unsettled transactions. In addition to this
direct effect, there might be significant indirect, so-called network effects. Namely, as the liquidity position of each VIBER
participant is influenced by payment flows, if one settlement bank is not able to send payments, the liquidity position of the
remaining participants is threatened. This, in turn, could force the initially unaffected settlement banks to queue, and thus
delay payments. It might also happen that a large amount of liquidity is drained out of the system, as it is accumulated on the
account of the bank experiencing the technical problem. As a consequence, there might be banks short of liquidity and thus
they might end up with rejected payments at the end of the day. Both direct and indirect impacts are captured by the
performance indicators.
For simulation purposes, on the day of the incident the transactions initiated by the technically defaulted participants should
be removed or modified. The transactions should be removed if it is assumed that the operational problem cannot be solved
before the end of the day. The transactions should be modified if it is assumed that the bank managed to solve the operational
problem within the business day. In this latter case the time stamps (receipt times) of the transactions should be altered. The
modified time stamps should reflect the point in time when the bank managed to sort out the technical problem.
Payment instructions initiated by technically functioning participants (including infrastructure like the CSD/SSS) to be debited
or credited on the account of the defaulted participants are processed normally. Transactions processed normally include
mandated payments. In addition, warehoused outgoing payments of technically defaulted participant are processed normally
as well.
If it is assumed that the initially unaffected participants do not react to the shock, no modification in the initial dataset is
needed. However, the participants may react to the liquidity shock. If the banks apply the stop sending rule, the time stamp
of the transactions which are sent two hours after the beginning of the incident should be modified. The new time stamp of
the transactions should reflect the time of the restoration of the SWIFT connection. 
In the simulations it is implicitly assumed that the banks are able to solve the problem right after the official closing of VIBER
and somehow the payments are settled.
33
We do not aim to simulate two- or three-day operational incidents. If this were the
case, the disturbance in the payment system would be more significant and the entire economy would bear higher costs.
5.2  SIMULATED SCENARIOS
The simulations of operational failure scenarios are based on a combination of different assumptions (see Subsection 4.4). The
assumptions applied in the simulations are summarised in Table 8. In the first simulation setup (Scenario 1 to 3) entire-day
incidents were imitated. It was assumed that the operational failure starts at the beginning of the day and the bank under
distress cannot sort out the problem until the end of the business day. In each scenario one of the six systemically most
important banks became unable to send payment orders. In Scenario 1, shown in the first column of Table 8, no back-up
facilities and behavioural reactions were assumed. In Scenario 2 we examine the shock-mitigating impact of back-up facilities.
In Scenario 3 the disturbance of the payments system was assessed if technically non-defaulted participants took actions to
prevent the bank under distress from becoming a liquidity sink, and stopped sending payments to the bank experiencing the
technical default after two hours (stop sending rule).
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33 This could be achieved by prolongation of the official business hours and allowing VIBER to remain open until all the payments are settled. The use of InFoRex would
be another possibility; however, it is highly unlikely that all the transactions can be settled as the procedure is paper-based.
5  Simulation results
SIMULATION RESULTS
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In the second simulation setup more realistic part-time incidents were simulated. We looked for worst-case scenarios in which
operational failures of given length occurred when the value weighted submission delay for payment orders sent by one of the
six systemically most important banks was the highest.
34
During the optimization procedure the value of payments postponed
were weighted by the time lag between the submission time and the end of the operational incident. The weighing of payments
by the time left until the end of the incident takes into account both the value of the payment and the delay in submission
(consequently the delay in settlement). In this way, we suppose that each payment is time-critical, that is, it is important when
the payment is submitted into the central queue via SWIFT and when it is settled. Other optimization procedures should have
been used as well. In the future, by examining the behaviour of affected and unaffected participants, we plan to elaborate
more on this.
For the optimization procedure only the length of the incident and the number of technically-defaulted banks were provided
as input parameters (Table 8). It was assumed that the technical problem can be sorted out either in four or in six hours, but
surely no later than the end of the business day.
35
In Scenario 4 and 5 one bank defaulted technically and the incident lasted
for four or six hours respectively. Scenario 6 corresponds to a situation when an operational problem affected two banks
simultaneously for four hours. It was assumed that the incidents began simultaneously, at the same moment. For the sake of
simplicity, it was also assumed that the technical problems are sorted out within the same time period.
The output of the optimization provided us with the starting point of the operational failure and the list of technically
defaulted participants. The timing and the technically defaulted bank(s) were not necessarily the same across the days.
36
They
were highly dependent on the daily payments patterns. The stop sending rule was applied in none of the part-time incident
scenarios. As the bank(s) averted the source of the operational problem within the business day, we did not analyse the effects
of various contingency procedures and back-up facilities. Note that if the time-criticality of transactions were at our disposal
we could apply back-up procedures for those. In such cases we would assume that technically defaulted banks are eager to
settle those payments even if they are duplicated.
5.3  DISTURBANCE IN THE PAYMENT SYSTEM: ENTIRE-DAY INCIDENTS (SCENARIOS
1-3)
5.3.1  Scenario 1: Entire-day incidents – no back-up facilities and no behavioural
reactions
The simulation results for the first scenario are summarised in Tables 9 and 10. As a first step it was assumed that the bank with
the highest turnover suffers from an operational incident and is unable to submit payments during the entire business day. The
counterparties did not change their behaviour and back-up facilities were not in place. Detailed results of the simulations
accessing the impact of the other five technically defaulted participants on the payment system are presented in Appendix 1.
Entire-day incident Part-time incident
Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6
Number of technically defaulted participants 1 1 1 1 1 2
Duration of the incident (hours) 9 9 9 4 6 4
Contingency procedures: Back-up facilities - + - - - -
Behavioural reaction of technically non-defaulted participants - - + - - -
Table 8
Various scenarios to be examined in simulation exercises
34 We could have examined the impact of the timing of the incident as well; and similar to Ledrut (2007) we could have analysed the severity of disruption in the
function of timing (e.g., incident occurs at 8:00, 8:30, 9:00, 9:30, etc.) We also could have analysed the consequences of the operational incidents at each bank
separately. Nevertheless, our aim was to gain information about the worst-case scenario, which provides us both the timing and the location (name of the banks) of
the incident as an output from the optimization procedure.
35 Quantifying the effects of incidents lasting for three or five hours, for example, could also have been reasonable and realistic. However, in order to keep the number
of simulated scenarios limited, we disregard these possibilities. Further research could be done in this direction as well.
36 Note that the method highlights which participant should be chosen if we want to simulate the impact of the most dramatic operational incident.
As shown in Table 9, due to the technical default of Bank 1 an average 16.30% of the payments could not be submitted to
the system. There were 6 out of the 41 days on which more than 20% of the payments sent in the benchmark scenario was
not submitted at all. Meanwhile, there were no rejected payments in the benchmark scenario. In this scenario on average
16.21% of the submitted payments remained unsettled. As demonstrated by the last column of Table 9, in the very extreme
worst-case scenario 21.72% of the payments were not submitted and 34.72% of the payments submitted were rejected. In
comparison with the benchmark scenario, on average altogether 30.99% of the payments remained unsettled, while in the
worst case 50.94% of the payments remained unsettled (either not submitted or rejected). If Bank 2 defaults technically, the
corresponding figures are 26.67% and 54.96%.
In international comparison the proportion of unsettled transactions is outstandingly high. This can be explained by the high
concentration of the debit and credit turnover and by the high rank correlations. The banks – being relatively badly endowed
with liquidity – rely consciously on the financing role of the incoming payments. Thus, if there is a deficit in the incoming
payments, outgoing payments cannot be settled due to lack of funds. Not surprisingly, the five banks disposing of the highest
value of unsettled transactions include the banks with the highest debit and credit turnover in VIBER. They account for around
88% of unsettled payments. Due to the liquidity drain effect, these banks are left with 26% of rejected payments on average
at the end of each day. Four other, small banks having strong relation to the banks active in the payment system suffer heavily
from the liquidity drain effect as well. They cannot send 16% to 34% of their payment orders respectively. All of the nine
banks can be found in the list of possibly endangered participants.
Compared to the benchmark case, the total value of queued transactions, measured as a percentage of submitted payments,
became approximately 2.4 times higher.
37
In the worst case, more than half (53.99%) of the submitted payments were in the
queue once, for either a shorter or longer period. Both the average and the maximum of the maximum queue value indicators
increased significantly, becoming 4.52 and 3.79 times higher respectively. The average queue length increased drastically as
well, it became 2.65 times higher an average. If Bank 1 suffered from an operational incident, the average of the settlement
delay indicator equalled 0.29. This is more than 4 times higher than in the benchmark case. Note that the minimum of the
delay indicator is 13 times higher than in the benchmark case.
Obviously, banks with the highest value of queued payments overlap with the banks disposing of the highest value of unsettled
transactions. The five banks most active in the payment system are responsible for around 87% of the queued transactions.
It is important to note that in the benchmark scenario only three of the five banks were among the banks with the most
significant queues. While in the benchmark scenario these three banks queued up 10.52-21.14% of their payment orders, if
Bank 1 defaults technically they queue up 65.74%-70.35% of their payments. At the end of the business day the three banks
could not fulfil around 30% of their payment obligations. These payments were rejected due to lack of funds. In relative terms
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37 It is important to note that the initially not submitted payments were excluded from the indicator.
Bank 1 - Entire-day incident Minimum Average Maximum
Value of payments initially not submitted
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 4.62% 16.30% 21.72%
Value of rejected payments 
(as % of submitted payments) 0.00% 16.21% 34.72%
Value of unsettled payments
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 1.96% 30.99% 50.94%
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 3.38% 38.37% 53.99%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 2.69% 19.42% 41.98%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 0:55:12 1:49:41 2:35:21
Settlement delay 0.13 0.29 0.50
Table 9
Disturbance in the payment system: operational incident at Bank 1
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the other two banks were even more seriously affected by the operational incident; in the distressed situation they queue up
an average 48.94% and 41.87% of their payments. The corresponding figures in the benchmark scenario equalled 0.70% and
0.09% respectively. At the same time, at the end of the day the banks were also left with significant amount of unsettled
payments; 25.64% and 18.49% of their payment orders remained unsettled. In the case of the four (already mentioned) small
banks, which also suffer heavily from the liquidity drain effect, the ratio of queued payments over submitted payments is
higher than 30% (ranging from 30.63% to 80.78% and showing high variation).
Similarly to the benchmark scenario, the settlement delay greatly varies across banks. The five banks disposing of the highest
average settlement delay (the average delay indicator exceeds 0.20) include four of the five most active banks and one of the
four small banks.
Table 10 compares the outcomes of the simulations if one of the six systemically important participants suffers from an
operational incident. 
The values shown in Table 10 are averaged over 41 days. The minimum and the maximum of the corresponding indicators
are shown in Appendix 1. Evidently, the lower the turnover of the participants in VIBER, the lower the value of payments
initially not submitted to the system (measured as a percentage of value of payments of the benchmark scenario). The value
of unsettled payments also decreases slightly. In the case of the bank with the highest turnover on average 16.21% of the
submitted payments were rejected, while in the remainder of the cases the corresponding figure ranges from 0.49% to
13.77%.
The total value of queued transactions is almost the same for the first three banks. If an operational incident hits one of the
three banks with the largest turnover in VIBER, one third of the transactions are queued up for some time during the business
day. The corresponding figure is one fifth for the bank with the sixth largest turnover in VIBER. The maximum queue value,
the average queue length and the settlement also decrease significantly in relation to turnover. In general, queue and delay
indicators show a more favourable picture with the decreasing role of the shocked VIBER participants.
Table 11 focuses on the distribution of unsettled payments in the function of shocked banks, while Table 12 highlights the
minimum, the average and the maximum of the settlement delay in the function of shocked banks. 
Various factors might influence the severity of the shocks. The most important factors include the network structure, payment
and liquidity management habits, and timing behaviour. The true mechanism concerning how these factors influence the
disturbance of the payment system is so far undiscovered. However, the message from the simulation exercise is
straightforward. Regarding liquidity levels and unchanged timing behaviour, an operational incident at the most active players
can lead to serious disturbances in VIBER. The disturbance highly depends on the daily payment patterns; the severity caused
by the incident changes from day to day. Analysing the figures in Table 11 it is obvious that in the case of Bank 1, Bank 2
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6
Value of payments initially not submitted
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 16.30% 13.68% 10.27% 6.58% 5.84% 4.49%
Value of rejected payments
(as % of submitted payments) 16.21% 13.77% 6.95% 3.09% 2.67% 0.49%
Value of unsettled payments
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 30.99% 26.67% 17.18% 9.91% 8.62% 5.13%
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 38.37% 39.40% 34.17% 30.54% 25.41% 22.75%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 19.42% 17.79% 13.08% 9.43% 7.64% 6.11%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 1:49:41 2:07:23 1:27:39 1:07:35 0:59:17 0:43:51 
Settlement delay 0.29 0.27 0.20 0.12 0.10 0.08
Table 10
Disturbance of the payment system according to technically defaulted banks in Scenario 1
and Bank 3 the probability that their technical default would cause only minor effects in the system is very low. Operational
incidents at these banks require special attention, especially if their problem cannot be sorted out until the end of the day. There
are several lines of defence which can mitigate the severity of such operational incidents. The first includes (electronic) back-
up facilities. If they work properly the incident might not even be noticed by other VIBER participants. In the next subsection
we examine the impact of the time-consuming, paper-based back-up solution. The second factor which can provide some
protection for the intact members lies in adapting to the situation. It is important to note that the technically non-defaulted
banks most probably would trade with operationally viable counterparties more than with the bank in a distressed situation.
If this is the case, the payment pattern is changed as part of the intraday trade is adjusted. Since the intraday financial market
trades were not identified in the paper, we overestimate the consequences of operational incidents. The expectations of
operationally viable banks and information asymmetry between the technically defaulted and operationally viable banks are
also of major importance.
5.3.2  Scenario 2: Entire-day incidents – Back-up facilities without behavioural
reactions
In this section we examine the shock-mitigating impact of back-up facilities. We assume that effective business continuity
arrangements are in place and back-up options are employed one hour before the closure of the system. The processing of
payments was supposed to be carried out manually. Thus, we do not count with the possibility that the back-up options allow
the settlement of a very large number of payments before the closure of the system. In the simulations it was assumed that
the banks under distress can submit altogether 50 payments. The payments were ranked initially by priority provided by the
banks, secondly by the amount of the transactions and thirdly by the CAS receipt time. The first 50 transactions in this ranking
were submitted to VIBER one hour before the closure of the system.
38
Note that implicitly it was assumed that the internal
systems of the stricken banks work properly and thus the stricken banks have up-to-date information about their payment
obligations. Another selection procedure could also have been followed to pick out the 50 manually processed payments. By
the above detailed ranking mechanism we aimed at selecting the most time-critical transactions. On the one hand, we took
the prioritization given by the submitter banks into account by assuming that the priority orders would remain unchanged in
the event of the shocks. On the other, by taking the amount of the transactions into account, we assumed that submitters
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Scenario1 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6 Benchmark
Minimum 0.13 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
Average 0.29 0.27 0.20 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.07
Maximum 0.50 0.58 0.44 0.34 0.3 0.16 0.16
Table 12
Minimum, average and maximum of the settlement delay indicator
The number of business days in the examined period was 41.
Scenario1 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6 Benchmark
Minimum 1.96% 1.79% 1.78% 0.83% 1.04% 2.26% 0.00%
Average 30.99% 26.67% 17.18% 9.91% 8.62% 5.13% 0.00%
Maximum 50.94% 54.96% 32.97% 22.45% 25.21% 12.89% 0.00%
Number of days when higher than 20% 37 29 11 1 4 0 0
Number of days when higher than 10% 40 39 35 15 10 2 0
Number of days when higher than 5% 40 40 40 36 30 18 0
Table 11
Distribution of unsettled payments
(as % of payments submitted in the benchmark scenario)
38 It would have been more realistic to distribute these payments uniformly in the last hour of VIBER. However, the modification of the receipt time stamps would require
more effort. By uniformly distributing the time stamps of the payments in the last hour of VIBER, the delay indicator became lower.
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minimise the value of unsettled payments. Other ranking procedure would have been feasible as well. The impact of the
selection procedure is an interesting area for future research. The analysis of the participants’ behaviour in this respect is also
of crucial importance.
Table 13 summarises the disturbance in the payment system under Scenario 2. The values shown in Table 13 are averaged
over 41 days. The minimum and the maximum values of the corresponding indicators are shown in Appendix 2. If Bank 1
submits 50 payments out of its daily 482 payments at the end of the business day, then only 2.96% of the payments were not
submitted to the system instead of the 16.30% of the payments in Scenario 1. (For comparison see Table 10.) The value of
rejected payments also decreased significantly, from 16.21% to 0.08%. There is no such significant decline in the value of the
indicators relating to the queue statistics. The significant queues and delays in the system can be explained by the fact that the
payments of the technically defaulted bank are channelled to the system in the last hour of the business day.
If Bank 2 or Bank 3 suffer from the operational incident, but make use of back-up facilities, then the decline in the proportion
of not submitted and rejected payments is significantly lower than in the case of Bank 1. This can be explained by the fact
that the 50 transactions that were booked manually are not of the largest value. On several days Bank 2 and Bank 3 had many
customer payments with high priority. As the value of these payments is much lower than the value of the bank-to-bank
payments (containing loro payments as well), it could happen that the payments with the far highest value were not submitted
to the system. On these days the liquidity drain effect showed a very similar pattern to that of Scenario 1.
As shown in Table 13, if Bank 4 is under distress but uses the back-up facility, then the disturbance of the payments system
is somehow similar to the disturbance caused by Bank 1. In the former case, 3.08% of the payments of the benchmark scenario
was not submitted. Nevertheless, the proportion of rejected payments is higher, 0.96%. The total value of queued transactions
and the average queue length were more or less the same, while the maximum queue value and the settlement delay were
lower.
If Bank 5 and Bank 6 are technically defaulted but 50 of their transactions are booked manually at the end of the business
day, there will be almost no rejected payments. More precisely, there were six days out of the 2 x 41 when one payment
remained unsettled. Compared to the benchmark scenario, the queues became larger and lasted longer.
Table 14 shows the distribution of unsettled payments in the function of shocked banks, while Table 15 focuses on the
minimum, the average and the maximum of the settlement delay in the function of shocked banks. 
Finally, let us compare the results of the entire-day incident with and without back-up facilities. Even if the number of
payments processed manually is limited, the effect of the submission into the system of the payments stuck in the internal
queues of the technically defaulted banks is positive. This is obvious if we compare Table 14 with Table 11 and Table 15 with
Table 12. The improvement depends heavily on the selection procedure of manually processed payments. We have chosen a
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6
Value of payments initially not submitted
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 2.96% 8.16% 4.99% 3.08% 0.23% 0.10%
Value of rejected payments
(as % of submitted payments) 0.08% 5.77% 2.25% 0.96% 0.00% 0.00%
Value of unsettled payments
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 3.26% 14.54% 7.45% 4.40% 0.25% 0.11%
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 32.10% 36.66% 31.94% 29.54% 22.99% 21.64%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 16.43% 16.49% 12.33% 9.07% 7.01% 5.84%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 1:20:28 1:08:39 1:14:33 1:14:33 0:52:42 0:42:28
Settlement delay 0.24 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.08
Table 13
Disturbance of the payment system in Scenario 2
prioritization which leads to significant improvement if the incident happened at Bank 1, Bank 5 or Bank 6. The disruption
of the payments system remained almost unchanged when operational failure occurred at Bank 2, Bank 3 or Bank 4. In sum,
the improvement achieved by back-up facilities is highly dependent on how the technically defaulted institution chooses its
payments processed manually in a distressed situation.
5.3.3  Scenario 3: Entire-day incidents – Behavioural reactions without back-up
facilities
Table 16 shows the disturbance of the payments system if one of the banks is hit by an operational incident and the rest of
the system reacts to it by blocking their payments to the stricken bank within two hours.
39
By comparing Table 16 with 
Table 10 we can conclude that by applying the stop sending rule the initially not submitted payments increased significantly
and the value of rejected payments decreased drastically. The composition of unsettled payments is very different. In
Scenario 1 a high proportion of payments is rejected due to insufficient liquidity. The liquidity drain effect is significant;
many banks suffer from the impact of the technical default. In contrast, in Scenario 3 banks try to escape from the liquidity
drain effect by not submitting their payments to the bank under distress. Many payments are withheld; the high disruption
of the payment system can be explained by this behaviour. It is important to stress that, despite the higher proportion of
unsettled payments in Scenario 3, the shock remains isolated. The disruption of the payment system is strongly connected
to payments not submitted by the bank under distress and to payments not submitted to the bank under distress.
The value of payments that remained unsettled (either not submitted or rejected) is higher in Scenario 3 than in 
Scenario 1. This is the price of isolating the shock and privileging payments sent to other participants. The higher value
of unsettled payments means that some kept-back payments could have been settled. If we compare the evolution of queues
and delays in Scenario 1 and Scenario 3, it can be concluded that in Scenario 3 the transactions are settled more smoothly,
the queues and the delays are lower. For a more detailed insight into the disturbance of the payment system under 
Scenario 3, see Appendix 3.
Table 17 highlights the distribution of unsettled payments in the function of shocked banks, while Table 18 shows the
minimum, the average and the maximum of the settlement delay in the function of shocked banks. 
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Scenario 2 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6 Benchmark
Minimum 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
Average 0.24 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.07
Maximum 0.42 0.47 0.44 0.34 0.24 0.16 0.16
Table 15
Minimum, average and maximum of the settlement delay indicator 
Scenario 2 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6 Benchmark
Minimum 0.13% 0.96% 0.84% 0.39% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Average 3.26% 14.54% 7.45% 4.40% 0.25% 0.11% 0.00%
Maximum 8.41% 51.60% 32.07% 22.19% 1.05% 0.52% 0.00%
Number of days when higher than 20% 0 12 4 1 0 0 0
Number of days when higher than 10% 0 22 7 5 0 0 0
Number of days when higher than 5% 4 31 20 14 0 0 0
Table 14
Distribution of unsettled payments
(as % of payments submitted in the benchmark scenario)
39 Note that a very high level of coordination is assumed among the banks, resulting in a rather improbable scenario.
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As Scenario 3 relies on behavioural expectations, the results should be analysed with caution. We applied stop sending rules
in the simulations without filtering out the intraday financial transactions (transactions agreed and settled on the day of the
incident), which could be misleading. In order to see the influence of the stop sending rule, intraday financial transactions
should be mapped. In addition, we think that stop sending is very doubtful behaviour. It is more realistic to assume that
operationally viable participants fulfil their agreed obligations in the course of the day and payments sent to the technically
defaulted bank are placed to the end of the internal or external queues. It could also happen that transactions in question are
only submitted at the end of the business day. If in the absence incoming payments the participants face liquidity deficit and
cannot finance all of their outgoing transactions, they would try to finance payments to the participant under distress from
the payments to be received from the participant suffering from the shock. Consequently, management of the loss reallocation
would be easier afterwards. Usually the loss reallocation works very smoothly between participants. Further research is
required to map changes in intraday trading patterns and to assess how liquidity managers adapt to the situation. In order to
gain more in-depth analysis we aim to interview critical VIBER participants and try to model those factors which cannot be
forecasted (liquidity management, how information asymmetry ceases in the system, etc.). In Scenario 3 an oversimplified
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6
Value of payments initially not submitted
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 29.62% 25.47% 18.36% 12.11% 10.91% 7.99%
Value of rejected payments
(as % of submitted payments) 2.55% 1.99% 1.59% 0.69% 0.45% 0.24%
Value of unsettled payments
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 32.54% 28.16% 20.43% 13.30% 11.77% 8.48%
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 19.49% 23.53% 22.78% 20.80% 17.12% 18.04%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 7.06% 7.75% 7.46% 5.87% 4.79% 4.93%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 0:51:35 1:13:18 1:17:31 0:46:01 0:47:18 0:45:23
Settlement delay 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.07
Table 16
Disturbance of the payment system in Scenario 3
Scenario 3 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6 Benchmark
Minimum 3.12% 3.38% 3.17% 2.16% 1.73% 4.28% 0.00%
Average 32.54% 28.16% 20.43% 13.30% 11.77% 8.48% 0.00%
Maximum 49.04% 47.80% 37.93% 22.14% 23.45% 16.74% 0.00%
Number of days when higher than 20% 40 36 24 6 1 0 0
Number of days when higher than 10% 40 40 40 30 24 9 0
Number of days when higher than 5% 40 40 40 39 40 38 0
Table 17
Distribution of unsettled payments
(as % of payments submitted in the benchmark scenario)
Scenario 3 Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6 Benchmark
Minimum 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Average 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07
Maximum 0.20 0.32 0.26 0.18 0.23 0.21 0.16
Table 18
Minimum, average and maximum of the settlement delay indicator
approach was applied, thus the results of the scenario should be considered as indicative. Further research is needed to
identify intraday trades and the way in which participants would re-prioritise their payments.
5.4  GROSS AND NET LIQUIDITY DEFICITS IN SCENARIO 1 AND SCENARIO 2
It is important to have an idea of the additional liquidity that would be required to settle all rejected transactions. The value
of rejected payments provides only an indication, as it does not take into account the liquidity circulation. Namely, the
settlement of payments provides funds for the credited banks and from that liquidity other transactions could be settled. By
considering liquidity circulation in the system and taking into account the set of unsettled transactions, the end-of-day
balances and the intraday credit lines, the metric of gross liquidity deficit (GLD) of bank i is calculated:
(Eq. 3)
where – p
ij
out
is the value of outgoing payments from participant i to participant j that was submitted by participant i, but
due to insufficient funds became rejected,
– p
ik
in
is the value of incoming payments from participant k to participant i that would have been received by
participant i, if participant k would not be short of liquidity,
– b
i
end
is the end-of-day balance of participant i, which can be positive, zero or negative,
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and
– IDCL
i
end
is the amount of intraday credit line of participant i at the end of the business day.
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The first sum in Equation 3 refers to the value of payments sent, but rejected due to insufficient liquidity of participant i. The
second sum in Equation 3 is the value of payments expected by participant i but not received over the course of the business
day. The second part of Equation 3 equals the funds available for settlement. Note that if participant i has more credited than
debited payment items, then the value of the gross liquidity deficit equals zero. This is also the case if the participant has more
funds available for settlement (IDCL
i
end
+ b
i
end
), than the value of net payments ( ).
On a system level the gross liquidity deficit is simply the sum of the GLDs of individual participants. The metric calculated
in this way shows the minimum amount of money needed to enable all participants to clear transactions in the queues and to
avoid rejections at the end of the day.
The required liquidity could be injected into the system in various ways. Technically non-defaulted participants hit by the
operational incident are not passive agents. They can raise additional funds in several ways. For instance, participants short
of liquidity can transact with their counterparties in the money market in order to gain funds for their queued payments.
42
There are countries in which the money market deal is enhanced by the central bank itself. For example, the ‘stricken bank
scheme’ in the United Kingdom (Bedford et al., 2004) requires the settlement bank that is unable to resume normal payment
processing operations by 4 p.m. to extend uncollateralised overnight loans (settled manually by the Bank of England) to any
unaffected settlement bank requiring additional liquidity. 
The liquidity assistance required might also be provided by the central bank in the framework of monetary policy operations.
By pledging eligible assets as collateral, VIBER participants can always get higher intraday credit lines. If the overdraft is not
eliminated until the end of the business day, the intraday credit is transformed into overnight credit. The interest paid on the
overnight credit is determined by the ceiling of the interest rate corridor. At their discretion central banks might provide the
liquidity required under favourable terms and conditions by means of open market operations. For example, the FED did this
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40 Negative end-of-day balances refer to overdrafts. Note that a bank might have a positive end-of-day balance even if it has rejected payments. In this case the positive
balance of the participant is too small to settle any of the queued outgoing payments.
41 Note that a bank might have an unexploited intraday credit line (overdraft is less than the maximum allowed) even if it has rejected payments. In this case the
unexploited credit line is already too small to settle any of the queued outgoing payments.
42 If the market conditions are favourable, the participants might eliminate their overdraft positions.
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in September 2001. However, the participants might run out of eligible collateral. In this case the gross liquidity deficit cannot
be financed in the framework of monetary policy operations. It is the role of the central bank to decide whether it is ready
to accept additional, non-eligible collateral and intervene in its lender of last resort role. Due to moral hazard, the central
bank policies on lender of last resort are not disclosed. In general, central banks should consider the systemic implications of
the disruption of the payment system. If it large enough and the incident might threaten the financial stability of the entire
banking system, a central bank might intervene.
To gain a more comprehensive picture about the crystallization of the liquidity risk caused by operational incidents, the net
liquidity deficit (NLD) of bank i is computed in the following way:
(Eq. 4)
where – GLD
i
is the gross liquidity deficit participant i faces,
– POT
i
end
is the value of eligible assets possessed by participant i at the end of the business day, and
– IDCL
i
end
is the amount of intraday credit line of participant i at the end of the business day.
NLD gives some indication whether the eligible asset portfolios in the participants’ balance sheets would be enough to obtain
the required liquidity in the framework of monetary policy operations. Note that we overestimate the volume of potential
liquidity, as the banks also have to post collateral to other systems (e.g. bankcard settlement). 
In the following we have calculated gross and net liquidity deficits for each day and for the technical default of each
participant under Scenarios 1 and 2. Table 19 shows the gross liquidity deficit as a percentage of rejected payments in 
Scenario 1. Table 20 also demonstrates the gross liquidity deficit; however, as a percentage of initially not submitted payments
in Scenario 1. According to Table 19, taking the offsetting role of incoming payments and the residual liquidity into account,
on average 35-50% of the rejected payments would be required to settle all the submitted transactions. Figures lower than
100% mean that banks partially queue payments against each other, but due to insufficient funds they are in a deadlock
situation. In the worst cases this offsetting is significantly lower. The figures depend on the systemic importance of the bank
suffering from the initial shock.
If we compare the gross liquidity deficit figures with the value of initially not submitted payments (Table 20) we can conclude
that, depending on the technically defaulted bank, on average 5-39% of the initially not submitted payments would have been
sufficient to avoid end of day rejections.
Table 21 shows the net liquidity deficit as a percentage of the turnover of the benchmark case for a typical day, for the worst-
case scenario and for the least problematic business day in Scenario 1. As the role played by VIBER participants in the payment
system increases, the lack of liquidity buffer in the participants’ balance sheets on a typical day usually increases. However,
in line with the findings on performance indicators when Bank 2 defaulted technically, the net liquidity deficit was higher
than in the case of Bank 1. The net liquidity deficit that would be required on average above the eligible assets in the
( )[ ]{ }0;max endiendiii IDCLPOTGLDNLD −−=
Scenario 1: GLD/Rejected Bank1 Bank2 Bank3 Bank4 Bank5 Bank6
Minimum 0.00% 24.57% 12.67% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Average 46.42% 52.40% 49.08% 55.19% 48.49% 36.83%
Maximum 75.89% 88.53% 99.88% 96.29% 100.00% 97.40%
Percentile (25%) 39.80% 41.83% 32.87% 39.57% 17.64% 0.00%
Table 19
Gross liquidity deficit – Scenario 1
(percentage of rejected payments)
participants’ balance sheets to settle all transactions ranges from 0.14% to 3.64% of the turnover of the benchmark scenario.
In the worst-case scenario, depending on the systemic importance of the bank suffering from the initial shock, the additional
liquidity required ranges from 2.28% to 7.94% of the turnover of VIBER. 
Table 22 displays the individual data on net liquidity deficits. The first column of the table refers to the bank which
experienced the operational incident. The first row of the table shows those banks that require additional liquidity. As show
by Table 22, there is high variation across banks suffering from the operational incident. In Scenario 1 the daily net liquidity
deficit at system level ranges from 0.1 to 316 billion HUF on average. The range of the interval strongly depends on the
technically defaulted bank and on the business day.
The results presented in Table 22 are in line with the clustering (Subsection 4.3.3). Almost all banks encountering liquidity
problems were identified as endangered participants. Nevertheless, not all the endangered participants suffered from the
liquidity shock. At least three of the five technically not defaulted banks with the highest VIBER turnover and two small banks
always appear in Table 22. The banks with highest turnover account for the majority of the net liquidity deficit.
Table 22 also shows the number of days (out of the maximum 41) on which the value of the eligible collateral of the
participants (in the column) does not cover the liquidity needed to settle all payment obligations if the bank shown in the row
becomes technically defaulted. The following conclusions can be drawn from the table:
• If Bank 1, Bank 2, Bank 3 or Bank 6 are unable to submit payment obligations, seven banks are more or less seriously
affected. They are not able to fulfil their payment obligations, even if all their eligible securities are posted as collateral.
Four participants could have had problems on more than half of the days if Bank 1 or Bank 2 had defaulted technically.
The empirical probability of liquidity problems decreases when an operational incident at Bank 3 or Bank 6 was simulated. 
• If Bank 4 suffers from an operational incident eight banks are affected, as their eligible assets do not cover their payment
obligations. In the case of the eight participants, the number of days with net liquidity deficit ranges between 1 and 12.
• If Bank 5 defaults technically most probably two out of the six banks would require additional liquidity to fulfil their
payment obligations.
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Scenario 1: GLD/Not submitted Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6
Minimum 0.00% 1.24% 1.08% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Average 36.19% 38.86% 23.02% 15.36% 15.54% 5.32%
Maximum 67.31% 68.94% 57.58% 44.88% 44.60% 38.24%
Percentile (25%) 27.55% 30.47% 10.46% 4.30% 0.77% 0.00%
Table 20
Gross liquidity deficit – Scenario 1
(percentage of initially not submitted payments)
Scenario 1: NLD/Benchmark turnover Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6
Minimum 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Average 2.09% 3.64% 1.66% 0.55% 0.64% 0.14%
Maximum 5.90% 7.94% 6.25% 2.91% 2.88% 2.28%
Percentile (25%) 0.87% 1.46% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Table 21
Net liquidity deficit – Scenario 1
(percentage of the turnover of the benchmark scenario)
SIMULATION RESULTS
MNB OCCASIONAL PAPERS 75. • 2008 45
Table 22
Individual data on banks encountering liquidity problems – Scenario 1
Scenario1 - NLD
Sum
Banks encountering liquidity problems (NLD>0)
Technically 
defaulted 
banks
Indicators Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E Bank F Bank G Bank H
Bank 1
Number of days when a 
participant encountered 
liquidity problems
 37     24     23     21     20     12     6     1     - 
Minimum of NLD across the 
days (million HUF)  5,590     543     4,540     2,533     556     44     3,997     1,084     - 
Average of NLD across the 
days (million HUF)  82,723     11,894     32,794     52,491     22,097     23,278     32,723     1,084     - 
Maximum of NLD across the 
days (million HUF)  192,031     31,326     112,824     132,511     72,361     78,399     66,604     1,084     - 
Bank 2
Number of days when a 
participant encountered 
liquidity problems
 39     36     24     22     16     8     8     3     - 
Minimum of NLD across the 
days (million HUF)  9,165     255     66     4,753     1,922     2,258     1,346     8,947     - 
Average of NLD across the 
days (million HUF)  136,400     99,434     23,104     32,139     14,069     21,490     5,763     11,767     - 
Maximum of NLD across the 
days (million HUF)  315,637     225,396     77,198     79,313     33,302     90,877     10,150     14,380     - 
Bank 3
Number of days when a 
participant encountered 
liquidity problems
 30     25     16     16     7     6     3     2     - 
Minimum of NLD across the 
days (million HUF)  2,070     2,136     2,774     287     108     3,792     29     4,550     - 
Average of NLD across the 
days (million HUF)  78,197     59,594     22,946     18,310     16,607     11,325     72     5,770     - 
Maximum of NLD across the 
days (million HUF)  220,703     140,540     67,454     62,674     49,612     16,532     156     6,990     - 
Bank 4
Number of days when a 
participant encountered 
liquidity problems
 24     12     12     10     6     3     2     2     1    
Minimum of NLD across the 
days (million HUF)  525     1,643     946     525     568     1,546     857     239     8,337    
Average of NLD across the 
days (million HUF)  32,568     30,229     14,893     6,810     9,193     29,310     8,744     1,582     8,337    
Maximum of NLD across the 
days (million HUF)  99,258     82,828     40,922     19,411     25,322     46,573     16,630     2,925     8,337    
Bank 5
Number of days when a 
participant encountered 
liquidity problems
 21     11     9     5     2     2     1    - -
Minimum of NLD across the 
days (million HUF)  3,407     4,356     3,407     8,260     18,460     3,484     1,692    - -
Average of NLD across the 
days (million HUF)  43,197     51,268     16,194     23,898     29,445     8,688     1,692    - -
Maximum of NLD across the 
days (million HUF)  104,008     104,008     37,166     44,775     40,431     13,892     1,692    - -
Bank 6
Number of days when a 
participant encountered 
liquidity problems
 9     3     2     2     2     1     1     1    -
Minimum of NLD across the 
days (million HUF)  111     1,845     7,504     7,196     254     40,725     111     85,849    -
Average of NLD across the 
days (million HUF)  26,386     4,354     10,931     34,876     3,057     40,725     111     85,849    -
Maximum of NLD across the 
days (million HUF)  93,353     8,349     14,358     62,556     5,860     40,725     111     85,849    -
The Hungarian Post was excluded from the analysis.
Banks encountering problems were ranked on the basis of the number of days when they faced net liquidity deficit. Consequently, Bank A in the case of
the technical default of Bank 1 is not necessarily the same as Bank A in the case of the technical default of Bank 2.
We have calculated the gross and liquidity deficits in Scenario 2 as well. The results are displayed in Table 23 and 24. The
overall picture has improved significantly if back-up facilities were in place.
Table 25 shows that the net liquidity deficit as a percentage of the turnover of the benchmark scenario is lower if back-up
facilities are in place. The decrement is less significant in the cases of Bank 2, Bank 3 and Bank 4. This can be explained by
the lower effectiveness of the procedure on the basis of which the critical payments to be processed manually are selected.
On average the net liquidity deficit varies from 0% to 1.14% of turnover of the benchmark scenario. In the worst-case
scenario, depending on the systemic importance of the bank suffering from the initial shock and the efficacy of the back-up
facility, the net liquidity deficit ranges from 0% to 6.29% of the turnover of VIBER. 
Table 26 demonstrates indicators on net liquidity deficit at participant level. Banks with net liquidity deficits include the same
institutions (both in the worst-case and on typical days) that encountered problems in Scenario 1. However, the net liquidity
deficit was notably lower.
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Scenario 2: GLD/Rejected Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6
Minimum 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Average 12.63% 36.56% 32.93% 23.25% 0.00% 0.06%
Maximum 96.17% 95.61% 97.24% 85.08% 0.00% 1.00%
Percentile (25%) 0.00% 20.71% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Table 23
Gross liquidity deficit – Scenario 2 
(percentage of rejected payments)
Scenario 2: GLD/Not submitted Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6
Minimum 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Average 0.92% 18.17% 9.66% 5.52% 0.00% 0.05%
Maximum 19.55% 63.23% 52.51% 42.43% 0.00% 1.65%
Percentile (25%) 0.00% 1.47% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Table 24
Gross liquidity deficit – Scenario 2 
(percentage of initially not submitted payments)
Scenario 2: NLD/Benchmark turnover Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 Bank 6
Minimum 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Average 0.01% 1.14% 0.53% 0.16% 0.00% 0.00%
Maximum 0.39% 6.29% 4.57% 2.16% 0.00% 0.00%
Percentile (25%) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Table 25
Net liquidity deficit – Scenario 2 
(percentage of the turnover of the benchmark scenario)
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5.5  DISTURBANCE IN THE PAYMENT SYSTEM: PART-TIME INCIDENTS (SCENARIOS 4-6)
In Scenarios 4 and 5 it was assumed that one bank suffers from an operational incident and it is unable to send payment orders
to its counterparties for four and six hours respectively. The beginning and the end of the four- and six-hour intervals were
calculated by means of an optimization procedure detailed in Subsection 5.2. In Scenario 4 in 35, while in Scenario 5 in 32
out of the analysed 41 days the bank most active in the payment system would have to suffer from on operational incident
in order to cause the most severe disturbance in the payment system. On the other the days the second, third and fourth
participants most active in the payment system would have to suffer form the operational incident in order to have the most
serious impact on the payment system. In Scenario 6 in most of the cases the joint technical default of Bank 1 and Bank 2 (20
cases) vs. Bank 1 and Bank 3 (17 cases) generated the highest value of payments not submitted on time. 
Table 26
Individual data on banks encountering liquidity problems – Scenario 2
Scenario1 - NLD
Sum
Banks encountering liquidity problems (NLD>0)
Technically 
defaulted 
banks
Indicators Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E Bank F Bank G Bank G Bank H
Bank 1
Number of days when a 
participant encountered 
liquidity problems
3 2 1 1 - - - - - -
Minimum of NLD across the 
days (million HUF) 2,391    2,391    4,461    4,130    - - - - - -
Average of NLD across the 
days (million HUF) 9,103    9,359    4,461    4,130    - - - - - -
Maximum of NLD across the 
days (million HUF) 20,787    16,327    4,461    4,130    - - - - - -
Bank 2
Number of days when a 
participant encountered 
liquidity problems
22 16 11 9 7 6 4 3 2 1
Minimum of NLD across the 
days (million HUF) 2,983    588    58    8,711    2,366    1,346    2,983    8,947    18,890    17,564    
Average of NLD across the 
days (million HUF) 83,636    58,941    21,903    32,630    12,106    4,503    19,322    15,879    54,033    17,564    
Maximum of NLD across the 
days (million HUF) 309,028   174,544   77,040    78,488    22,021    8,366    42,605    24,388    89,176    17,564    
Bank 3
Number of days when a 
participant encountered 
liquidity problems
18 9 7 6 5 4 2 - - -
Minimum of NLD across the 
days (million HUF) 30    2,484    2,871    1,874    2,622    4,527     30    - - -
Average of NLD across the 
days (million HUF) 44,887    45,296    20,569    9,428    9,428    30,381     93    - - -
Maximum of NLD across the 
days (million HUF) 193,492    119,919    67,454    16,532    36,024    62,674     156    - - -
Bank 4
Number of days when a 
participant encountered 
liquidity problems
10 5 5 4 2 1 1 - - -
Minimum of NLD across the 
days (million HUF) 315    1,807    315    6,771    2,812    16,495    2,925    - - -
Average of NLD across the 
days (million HUF) 22,836    6,558    11,822    24,715    9,093    16,495     2,925    - - -
Maximum of NLD across the 
days (million HUF) 74,742    19,411    22,553    49,377    15,374    16,495     2,925    - - -
The Hungarian Post was excluded from the analysis.
Banks encountering problems were ranked on the basis of the number of days when they faced net liquidity deficit. Consequently, Bank A in the case of
the technical default of Bank 1 is not necessarily the same as Bank A in the case of the technical default of Bank 2.
Table 27 shows the value of transactions not submitted on time across Scenarios 4 to 6. The maximum, the average and the
minimum of the value of payments with delayed submission are displayed. Obviously, if the incident lasts longer or two banks
defaults technically, the value of transactions not submitted on time increases. In Scenario 4, 5 and 6 the average value of
transactions not submitted on time equals 466 billion, 541 billion and 806 billion HUF respectively.
Table 28 provides some information about the timing of the incidents. The beginning of the operational incidents occurring
the earliest, on average and the latest are highlighted. If the incident lasts six hours, it should start earlier compared to an
incident lasting for four hours. 
Table 29 illustrates the simulation results of the part-time incidents. Note that, as the values of payments initially not
submitted to the system and the value of unsettled payments equals zero, they are excluded from the table. By comparing the
simulation result to the benchmark scenario (see Table 3) we can conclude that, in line with our expectations, more queues
and longer delays show up in the system. The average of the total value of queued transactions increased by almost 50% in
Scenario 4 and 6, and by 75% in Scenario 5. The two extremes (minimum and maximum) almost remained unchanged. The
average of the maximum queue value also increased notably. Compared to the benchmark case it became 2.66, 3.55 and 3.85
times higher in Scenarios 5, 6 and 7 respectively. The maximum queue value is more than two times higher in each part-time
incident scenario than in the benchmark. The average queue length increased by 12 minutes in Scenario 4, by 27 minutes in
Scenario 5, and by 21 minutes in Scenario 6. In the benchmark case the average of the settlement delay equalled 0.07. The
average of the delay indicator increased by around 75% in Scenarios 4 and 6, and tripled in Scenario 5.
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Mimimum Average Maximum
Scenario 4 75,040 466,334 650,003 
Scenario 5 98,459 540,828 773,256 
Scenario 6 124,417 806,287 1,186,135 
Table 27
The value of transactions not submitted on time
(million HUF) 
Mimimum Average Maximum
Scenario 4 8:52:16 9:54:56 12:36:05
Scenario 5 8:01:22 9:25:48 10:16:16
Scenario 6 8:23:46 9:47:25 11:12:05
Table 28
The timing of the incidents
Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6
Minimum Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 2.43% 24.48% 37.92% 0.84% 28.73% 40.80% 2.96% 23.54% 37.71%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 1.98% 11.41% 24.77% 0.44% 14.39% 31.11% 1.98% 12.22% 24.68%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 0:23:48 0:52:58 1:21:04 0:46:16 1:07:56 1:59:37 0:16:52 1:01:57 1:27:19
Settlement delay 0.05 0.12 0.23 0.07 0.2 0.35 0.03 0.12 0.21
Table 29
Simulation results of the part-time incidents
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If we compare the part-time incident scenarios with each other it is interesting that Scenarios 4 and 6 show very similar
properties. In both cases the incidents lasted for four hours; nevertheless in Scenario 4 one, while in Scenario 6 two banks
suffered from the operational incidents. The similar queue and delay properties can be explained by two adverse effects. 
On one hand, the value of payments submitted later is higher in Scenario 6. This obviously should result in larger queues and
longer delays. On the other, the banks suffering from the operational incidents also transact intensively with each other. 
If both of them send their payments as soon as the incidents are sorted out, their payments will not stand in the queue or only
for a very short period. This is why it could happen that we do not experience more significant queues and delays in 
Scenario 6 than in Scenario 4. In Scenario 5 the operational incident lasted for six hours. The simulation results are in line
with our expectation – there are longer and larger queues and more significant delays. 
Numerous central banks have assessed the operational resilience of their large-value payment systems in a similar way as we
did in our study. It is an interesting question whether the disruption of the Hungarian payment system is more or less serious
than those experienced in other countries. It is important to note that the comparison of simulations is hindered by the
diversity of assumptions the authors made and by the variation of measures used to describe the severity of disruption in the
payment system. In the following we compare the simulation results obtained for the large-value payment systems of the
United Kingdom, France, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland with the Hungarian outcomes.
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The analysis of Bedford et al. (2004) showed that CHAPS Sterling is well placed to withstand a variety of operational
disruptions. The scenario constructed by the authors is mostly in line with Scenario 3 of our study, the simulation results of
which were presented in Table 16. Bedford et al. (2004) found that at the upper bound of liquidity the operational disruption
did not prevent settlement of any payments. The delay indicator was very close to zero if one bank defaulted technically, and
increased only up to 0.03 if three banks defaulted simultaneously. As in practice the total amount of intraday credit obtained
by the CHAPS Sterling settlement banks typically exceeds significantly the upper bound (by about half), the shock-absorbing
capacity of CHAPS Sterling might be considered as outstandingly high.
In the French case Mazars and Woefel (2005) simulated the technical default of the largest debtor in the PNS system. The
authors found that in the event of an entire-day default, almost 10% of payments (in value terms) between non-defaulting
participants could be rejected. At the same time the queues became larger and longer; on average 63.15% of the total
payments were queued up for 45 minutes. In the benchmark case the respective figures equalled 42.90% and 30 minutes,
thus both indicators increased by 50%. The delay indicator also increased significantly; compared to the benchmark case it
doubled (0.09 vs. 0.2). The simulation setup of Mazars and Woefel (2005) is basically equivalent to Scenario 1 formulated
in our paper. By comparing the French results with the Hungarian ones, we might conclude that the disruption is more sever
in VIBER than in PNS. In Hungary, in Scenario 1 the total value of queued payments became 2.33 times higher and the
average queue length became 2.68 times longer, while the delay indicator almost quadrupled in comparison with the
benchmark case.
Schmitz et al. (2006) constructed nine distinct scenarios to assess the shock-absorbing capacity of Austria’s ARTIS. One of the
scenarios captures the technical default of the top bank account for an entire day, without back-up options and behavioural
reactions.
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This scenario is in line with Scenario 1 worked out to assess the shock-absorbing capacity of VIBER. The payments
initially not submitted by the banks suffering from the operational incidents, expressed as a percentage of total turnover, were
very similar in the two systems: 16.30% in VIBER and 15.96% in ARTIS. Nevertheless, the proportion of unsettled payments
is much higher in Hungary than in Austria. In VIBER an average 30.99%, while in the worst case 50.94% of the payments
remained unsettled if the systemically most important bank defaulted technically. In contrast, in Austria an average 2.92%,
while in the worst case 8.39% of the payments were not fulfilled if the top bank account suffered from an operational
incident. The figures presented above refer to a more sever disruption of the Hungarian payment processing activity in the
case of an operational incident.
As a next step the simulation results of Ledrut (2007) for the Dutch interbank payment system, known as TOP, are compared
with the disruption experienced in VIBER. The author assesses the impact of an operational failure at one of the biggest
participants, varying the time at which the disruption takes place. For comparison purposes we focus exclusively on the
scenarios in which payments from the technically defaulted participant to the other banks are removed at the opening of the
system. In this case, on average 18.75% of the payments are not submitted initially by the defaulter. As a consequence, 16 of
the submitted payments remained unsettled on average, representing more than EUR 1 billion in value terms. In the worst
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6  International comparison
43 We do not aim to compare the simulation results obtained, for example, for the Danish RTGS (Bech and Soramäki, 2005) or for the Norwegian NBO (Enge and Øverli,
2006) systems with the Hungarian results. In both cases the scenarios analysed by the authors are not at all comparable with the scenarios formulated to assess the
shock-absorbing capacity of the Hungarian VIBER.
44 The remainder of the scenarios are not comparable with the scenarios formulated in our study, as they are related to the analysis of special functions of ARTIS or
TARGET, to the analysis of the impact of debit authorisation or to the assessment of the impact of simultaneous failure of the three most active accounts.
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case 45 payments remained unsettled, corresponding to more than EUR 2.2 billion in value terms. In the worst case the
proportion of unsettled payments (in value terms) might be around 1.35% of the payments submitted.
45
The delay indicator
equalled 0.13; in the benchmark case the indicator had a value of 0.08. In further scenarios Ledrud (2007) introduces the
reaction from other payment system participants. The scenario in which the banks cease to pay to the stricken bank within
two hours is in line with the assumptions made in Scenario 3 in our study. In this case in the Dutch system the average number
of unsettled payments equalled 5, corresponding to EUR 330 million. The average of the settlement delay equalled 0.14. If
we look at the simulation results of Scenario 1 (Table 10) and Scenario 3 (Table 16), we might conclude that in a case of an
operational incident the disruption of the Hungarian payment processing activity is more sever than the disruption of the
Dutch TOP system.
In the Financial Stability Review of the National Bank of Belgium (2007) the operational resilience of ELLIPS, the Belgian
RTGS, was assessed. One of the four different types of scenarios that was tested to simulate exogenous shocks included the
technical unavailability of a single participant during the whole day. This scenario is comparable with Scenario 1 of our
paper.
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In the Belgian case the severity of disruption was measured if problems arose at the level of one of the 5 major ELLIPS
participants. According to the article, even in the worst case the value and volume of the unsettled payment instructions (10
payments in a value of €2.7 billion) are quite low compared to the value and number of submitted payment instructions
(11,000 payments with a total value of €120 billion). In the report it is argued that the limited contagion effect is related to
the abundance of assets eligible as collateral and to the relatively limited importance of national payment instructions
compared to international payment instructions in ELLIPS. 
Finally, Glaser and Haene (2007) simulated participant level operational disruption in the Swiss Interbank Clearing, which is
an RTGS used for both large and small-value payments. The authors formulated a scenario in which one of the SIC members
is assumed to fail at the moment when the largest potential liquidity sink develops during the day. The SIC member
experiencing a problem cannot enter payments during the rest of the day after the disruption, while other members stop
making payments to the disrupted member only 2 hours after the disruption. The scenario formulated by Glaser and Haene
(2007) is more or less comparable with our Scenario 3. In Switzerland, in the worst case, if one of the two largest SIC
participants defaulted technically, 32% of the payments were not submitted from and to the failing bank, while another 30%
of the payments remained unsettled due to systemic effects. Thus, less than 40% of payments were settled correctly. In
contrast, In Hungary 29.62% of the payments were initially not submitted, and 2.55% were rejected, thus even in the worst
case 67.46% of the payments were settled correctly (see Table 16). In Switzerland the serious disruption of the payment flows
can be explained by the high concentration of payments (the two largest members dispose of more than 50% of the payments
in value terms) and by the relatively low liquidity levels in SIC (the effective liquidity to upper bound is 28%), which makes
this very liquidity efficient system vulnerable.
45 The figure was estimated as a ratio of EUR 2.2 billion over the value of payments settled on average in June 2004.
46 The remainder of the scenarios covered the bankruptcy of a single participant and the technical unavailability of the interlinking component.
The simulations carried out can be considered as a first step in evaluating the ability of the Hungarian payment system to
withstand certain types of operational shocks. We quantified the capacity of the system to function smoothly in the event of
operational incidents by simulating the technical default of VIBER participants. We set up hypothetical scenarios for
operational incidents by making various assumptions about the behavioural reactions of technically non-defaulted
participants, the timing and length of the operational failures, the number and list of technically defaulted participants, and
the application of existing back-up procedures. Altogether six hypothetical scenarios were formed, three entire-day incidents
and three part-time incidents. In the future it would be useful to simulate more plausible scenarios.
The impact of the technical default of one of the VIBER participants, thus the disturbance in the payment system was
measured by several indicators developed to describe the operation of an RTGS system. Among others, these indicators
include the value of initially not submitted payments, the value of rejected payments, the total value of queued payments, the
maximum queue value, the average queue length and the settlement delay. When entire-day incidents without back-up
options and behavioural reactions were simulated, the disturbance of the payment system was severe. By international
comparison the proportion of unsettled transactions is outstandingly high. As a consequence of the technical default of the
systemically most important participant, 16.21% of the submitted payments were rejected. In the worst case 34.72% of the
payments submitted were rejected. In comparison with the benchmark scenario, on average altogether 30.99% of the
payments remained unsettled, while in the worst case 50.94% of the payments remained unsettled (either not submitted or
rejected). If the bank with the second largest debit turnover defaulted technically, the corresponding figures were 26.67% and
54.96%. Queues and delays were also higher than in the simulation exercises of other countries. This can be explained by the
high concentration of the debit turnover in VIBER and by the fact that the most active participants are mainly not those that
are well equipped with liquidity. Another important explanation might be linked to the structure and size of the money
markets. In the euro zone the largest market participants might be considered as ‘small’, at least compared to the size of the
market. In contrast, in Hungary those market participants – getting involved in some Forint deals through their correspondent
banks – might be considered as large, especially compared to the size of the market. 
If back-up options are employed and fifty transactions of the technically defaulted participants are settled manually before
the closure of the system, then the disturbance of the payment system was significantly lower. If the systemically most
important bank experiences operational problems and submits fifty payments at the end of the business day, then only
2.96% of the payments were not submitted to the system instead of the previously experienced 16.30%. The value of
rejected payments also decreased significantly, from 16.21% to 0.08%. However, the shock-absorbing capacity of the system
depends heavily on the selection procedure of manually processed payments. We have chosen a selection procedure which
leads to an almost smoothly functioning payment system in the case of three banks, while the processing of payments was
highly disrupted when operational failure occurred at the other three banks. On the one hand, this stresses the importance
and the potential efficacy of back-up options. On the other, it highlights that the way in which the technically defaulted
institution chooses its payments processed manually in a distressed situation is of crucial importance. Thus, in the case of
operational incidents the MNB should stipulate that the banks select not only the transactions with the highest priority but
also those with the highest value.
Behavioural reactions were also taken into account; the initially unaffected participants reacted to the operational incident by
blocking payments to the stricken bank within two hours. By overcoming information asymmetry and applying the stop
sending rule, the initially not submitted payments increased significantly and the value of rejected payments decreased
drastically. By withholding many payments the value of payments remaining unsettled (either not submitted or rejected)
became higher. This is the price of isolating the shock and privileging payments sent to other participants. The higher value
of unsettled payments means that some of the kept-back payments could have been settled. By building behavioural reaction
into the model, several assumptions were made. In the absence of real entire-day incidents, it is hard to judge what would
happen with the information flow, how high the coordination among banks would be and when the information asymmetry
would be eliminated totally. We do not have proper knowledge about the potential changes in payment patterns (blocking of
payments, modifying time stamps or re-prioritizing payments) and modifications of intraday trade (trading altogether less and
trading more with operationally viable participants). Regarding our limited knowledge about the behaviour of participants in
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shock situations, our simulation results should be considered as indicative. Further research is needed to map the behaviour
of banks in distressed situations.
In two scenarios involving entire-day incidents, by means of the indicators of gross and net liquidity deficit, we calculated the
additional liquidity that would be required to settle all rejected transactions. By taking the residual liquidity of the
participants, the offsetting role of incoming payments and the liquidity circulation into account, on average 35-50% of the
rejected payments would be required to settle all submitted transactions. If the gross liquidity deficit is expressed in the value
of initially not submitted payments then, depending on the technically defaulted bank, on average 5-39% of the initially not
submitted payments would have been sufficient to avoid end-of-day rejections of transactions. The metric of net liquidity
deficit gives some indication whether the eligible asset portfolios in the participants’ balance sheets would be sufficient to
obtain the missing liquidity in the framework of monetary policy operations. We could see that an average 0.14% to 3.64%
of turnover of the benchmark scenario would be required above the eligible assets in the participants’ balance sheets to settle
all transactions. In the worst-case scenario, depending on the systemic importance of the bank suffering from the initial shock,
the additional liquidity required ranged from 2.28% to 7.94% of the turnover of VIBER. Analysing the individual data about
net liquidity deficit figures, we found that the daily net liquidity deficit at system level ranges from 0.1 to 316 billion HUF
on average. The range of the interval strongly depended on the technically defaulted bank and on the business day. The
overall picture improved significantly if back-up facilities were in place.
By analysing the impact of scenarios involving part-time incidents, we concluded that, similarly to the benchmark scenario,
the values of payments initially not submitted to the system and the value of unsettled payments equalled zero. Nevertheless,
more queues and longer delays showed up in the system. By comparing the part-time incident scenarios with each other, we
experienced similar settlement patterns in both four-hour scenarios, regardless of the number of defaulting banks. The similar
queue and delay properties can be explained in this case by the mutual interdependence of the two shocked banks – they trade
very actively with each other.
The simulation exercise has several drawbacks, which lead to the overestimation of liquidity risk. First of all, we assume that
the participants do not raise additional funds. However, participants short of liquidity can transact with their counterparties
in the money market, can obtain collateralised or uncollateralised credit from the mother bank or can agree upon a credit
with the central bank in the framework of its monetary policy operations. We tried to overcome this problem by examining
whether the participants have sufficient level of liquidity buffer. This was done by comparing the value of unsettled
transactions with the value of eligible assets in the balance sheet. Note that we overestimated the value of eligible assets, as
banks might pledge securities as collateral for other than payment purposes. 
The weakest point of the research lies in the behavioural assumptions of the study. We assumed unchanged trading patterns
during the entire business day, the banks planned to settle the same volume and value of transactions, with the same
counterparties and with the same priority as under normal business conditions. In this way we overestimate the severity of
disruption again. Most probably this type of behaviour would not be the case, as banks are not passive economic agents and
would adjust their trading patterns to the shock situation. Banks short of liquidity might postpone some of their transactions
and would make efforts to settle fewer transactions on the day of the shock. Moreover, the banks would surely favour
participants with operating infrastructure and with abundant liquidity. Thus, not only the value and volume of intraday
transactions would be lower, but also the counterparties to trade with would be reset.
Moreover, not only the trading patterns, but (excepting the scenario of applying the stop sending rule) the settlement
behaviour was also assumed to be constant. Banks initially not affected by the operational incident did not place the payments
to the technically defaulted bank to the end of the internal or external queues (for example, by giving a lower priority to
them), or did not alter the timing of the payments (for example, by submitting the transaction to the defaulter at the end of
the business day). In this way the severity of disruption might be overestimated again. In reality, in the absence of incoming
payments those participants that face liquidity shortage and cannot finance all of their outgoing transactions would change
their settlement pattern. Most probably they would try to finance payments to the participant under distress from the
payments to be received from the participant suffering from the shock by re-prioritizing or altering the time stamp of the
transactions. From this point of view the scenario with the behaviour of automatic stop sending is also improbable. As we
have argued previously, there are several reasons why banks do not stop sending certain payments to the stricken bank. First
of all, it is a very complex exercise to modify the list of payment orders waiting for transmission to the central settlement
engine, and it contains the risk of duplicating the settlement of transactions. Secondly, the banks cannot allow themselves to
risk their reputation. If a bank wishes to maintain its high prestige, the bank should fulfil its contractual commitments, even
when it experiences some problems. Thirdly, a contractual commitment is an obligation, if the bank does not fulfil it, than it
should count with the legal and financial consequences. The simulation results of the stop sending scenario should be
considered indicative. 
As we had no information concerning how the trading patterns and the settlement behaviour of the banks would change in
distressed periods, we tried to keep the simulations as simple as possible and avoided making further, more speculative
assumptions. Obviously, more research is needed to be able to answer all these questions. As a next step, by means of
qualitative and quantitative research methods, more investigation is needed to model precisely the behaviour of the banks in
shock situations.
As for policy implications, the role of the MNB in a crisis situation is of crucial importance. The MNB is the one that
communicates with the participants and might have an influence on the settlement behaviour by providing up-to-date
information about the nature of the operational incident. In addition, there seems to be a small number of VIBER participants
whose operational failure can affect heavily the functioning of the system. In the future, in the central bank oversight more
attention should be paid to the back-up facilities and procedures of (at least) these critical participants. In order to judge the
sufficiency of potential liquidity of the critical participants more precisely, assets not eligible as collateral should be also
mapped.
In sum, we would like to stress that the research should be considered as a first step towards mapping the operational
resilience of VIBER participants. We addressed several ‘what if’ types of question, mostly focusing on what would happen
with the payment system if one of the participants were unable to send payment messages. We made several assumptions; in
some cases we modelled real life more closely, while in others we formed a hypothetical world. We addressed many research
questions, some of which remain open and require further research.
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APPENDIX 1
Disturbance in the payment system
Scenario 1: Entire-day incidents – no back-up facilities and no behavioural reactions
Appendix
Bank 2 – Entire-day incident Minimum Average Maximum
Value of payments initially not submitted
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 4.15% 13.68% 21.21%
Value of rejected payments
(as % of submitted payments) 0.08% 13.77% 43.89%
Value of unsettled payments
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 1.79% 26.67% 54.96%
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 3.57% 39.40% 62.01%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 2.73% 17.79% 43.89%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 00:11:10 2:07:23 2:53:58
Settlement delay 0.12 0.27 0.58
Table 1
Disturbance in the payment system: operational incident at Bank 2
Bank 3 – Entire-day incident Minimum Average Maximum
Value of payments initially not submitted
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 3.77% 10.27% 13.76%
Value of rejected payments
(as % of submitted payments) 0.20% 6.95% 24.73%
Value of unsettled payments
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 1.78% 17.18% 32.97%
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 3.45% 34.17% 56.95%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 2.58% 13.08% 34.99%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 0:30:58 1:27:39 2:48:12
Settlement delay 0.05 0.20 0.44
Table 2
Disturbance in the payment system: operational incident at Bank 3
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Bank 4 – Entire-day incident Minimum Average Maximum
Value of payments initially not submitted
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 1.95% 6.58% 10.47%
Value of rejected payments
(as % of submitted payments) 0.00% 3.09% 14.05%
Value of unsettled payments
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 0.83% 9.91% 22.45%
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 2.76% 30.54% 53.45%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 1.90% 9.43% 22.72%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 00:11:04 1:07:35 1:50:32
Settlement delay 0.03 0.12 0.34 
Table 3
Disturbance in the payment system: operational incident at Bank 4
Bank 5 – Entire-day incident Minimum Average Maximum
Value of payments initially not submitted
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 2.45% 5.84% 10.07%
Value of rejected payments
(as % of submitted payments) 0.00% 2.67% 20.43%
Value of unsettled payments
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 1.04% 8.62% 25.21%
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 2.76% 25.41% 63.11%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 1.88% 7.64% 22.32%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 0:11:02 0:59:17 1:51:25
Settlement delay 0.02 0.10 0.30
Table 4
Disturbance in the payment system: operational incident at Bank 5
Bank 6 – Entire-day incident Minimum Average Maximum
Value of payments initially not submitted
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 2.25% 4.49% 7.58%
Value of rejected payments
(as % of submitted payments) 0.00% 0.49% 4.35%
Value of unsettled payments
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 2.26% 5.13% 12.89%
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 0.91% 22.75% 40.17%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 0.48% 6.11% 14.14%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 0:15:20 0:43:51 1:29:45
Settlement delay 0.02 0.08 0.16
Table 5
Disturbance in the payment system: operational incident at Bank 6
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APPENDIX 2
Disturbance in the payment system
Scenario 2: Entire-day incidents – back-up facilities without behavioural reactions
Bank 1 – Back-up options Minimum Average Maximum
Value of payments initially not submitted
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 0.32% 2.96% 6.19%
Value of rejected payments
(as % of submitted payments) 0.00% 0.08% 1.51%
Value of unsettled payments
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 0.13% 3.26% 8.41%
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 3.23% 32.10% 47.07%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 2.57% 16.43% 32.94%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 0:47:32 1:20:28 2:05:36
Settlement delay 0.11 0.24 0.42
Table 1
Disturbance in the payment system: operational incident at Bank 1
Bank 2 – Back-up options Minimum Average Maximum
Value of payments initially not submitted
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 2.08% 8.16% 16.53%
Value of rejected payments
(as % of submitted payments) 0.02% 5.77% 28.03%
Value of unsettled payments
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 0.96% 14.54% 51.60%
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 3.50% 36.66% 55.09%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 2.68% 16.49% 37.93%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 0:24:59 1:08:39 2:20:25
Settlement delay 0.08 0.18 0.47
Table 2
Disturbance in the payment system: operational incident at Bank 2
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Bank 3 – Back-up options Minimum Average Maximum
Value of payments initially not submitted
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 1.35% 4.99% 11.22%
Value of rejected payments
(as % of submitted payments) 0.00% 2.25% 24.68%
Value of unsettled payments
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 0.84% 7.45% 32.07%
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 3.39% 31.94% 56.91%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 2.46% 12.33% 34.94%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 0:33:42 1:14:33 2:24:54
Settlement delay 0.05 0.18 0.44
Table 3
Disturbance in the payment system: operational incident at Bank 3
Bank 4 – Back-up options Minimum Average Maximum
Value of payments initially not submitted
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 0.62% 3.08% 8.85%
Value of rejected payments
(as % of submitted payments) 0.00% 0.96% 13.99%
Value of unsettled payments
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 0.39% 4.40% 22.19%
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 2.73% 29.54% 61.98%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 1.80% 9.07% 22.66%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 0:33:42 1:14:33 2:24:54
Settlement delay 0.03 0.11 0.34
Table 4
Disturbance in the payment system: operational incident at Bank 4
Bank 5 – Back-up options Minimum Average Maximum
Value of payments initially not submitted
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 0.00% 0.23% 0.87%
Value of rejected payments
(as % of submitted payments) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Value of unsettled payments
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 0.00% 0.25% 1.05%
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 2.69% 22.99% 40.61%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 1.78% 7.01% 20.61%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 0:09:54 0:52:42 1:51:25
Settlement delay 0.02 0.09 0.24
Table 5
Disturbance in the payment system: operational incident at Bank 5
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APPENDIX 3
Disturbance in the payment system
Scenario 3: Entire-day incidents – behavioural reactions without back-up facilities
Bank 6 – Back-up options Minimum Average Maximum
Value of payments initially not submitted
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 0.00% 0.10% 0.48%
Value of rejected payments
(as % of submitted payments) 0.00% 0.00% 0.06%
Value of unsettled payments
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 0.00% 0.11% 0.52%
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 0.84% 21.64% 37.43%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 0.44% 5.84% 13.75%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 0:14:56 0:42:28 1:21:45
Settlement delay 0.02 0.08 0.16
Table 6
Disturbance in the payment system: operational incident at Bank 6
Bank 1 – Stop-sending Minimum Average Maximum
Value of payments initially not submitted
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 7.35% 29.62% 42.29%
Value of rejected payments
(as % of submitted payments) 0.00% 2.55% 10.07%
Value of unsettled payments
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 3.12% 32.54% 49.04%
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 2.72% 19.49% 35.80%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 1.56% 7.06% 15.91%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 0:21:59 0:51:35 1:41:20
Settlement delay 0.04 0.11 0.20
Table 1
Disturbance in the payment system: operational incident at Bank 1
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Bank 2 – Stop-sending Minimum Average Maximum
Value of payments initially not submitted
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 7.90% 25.47% 37.27%
Value of rejected payments
(as % of submitted payments) 0.00% 1.99% 8.07%
Value of unsettled payments
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 3.38% 28.16% 47.80%
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 2.23% 23.53% 46.56%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 1.36% 7.75% 17.33%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 0:20:32 1:13:18 1:49:26
Settlement delay 0.04 0.13 0.32
Table 2
Disturbance in the payment system: operational incident at Bank 2
Bank 3 - Stop-sending Minimum Average Maximum
Value of payments initially not submitted
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 7.46% 18.36% 26.20%
Value of rejected payments
(as % of submitted payments) 0.00% 1.59% 8.92%
Value of unsettled payments
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 3.17% 20.43% 37.93%
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 2.21% 22.78% 50.72%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 1.44% 7.46% 22.33%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 0:14:21 1:17:31 2:36:54
Settlement delay 0.02 0.11 0.26
Table 3
Disturbance in the payment system: operational incident at Bank 3
Bank 4 – Stop-sending Minimum Average Maximum
Value of payments initially not submitted
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 5.08% 12.11% 20.01%
Value of rejected payments
(as % of submitted payments) 0.00% 0.69% 5.38%
Value of unsettled payments
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 2.16% 13.30% 22.14%
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 1.61% 20.80% 38.63%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 0.53% 5.87% 13.67%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 0:11:04 0:46:01 2:12:17
Settlement delay 0.02 0.08 0.18
Table 4
Disturbance in the payment system: operational incident at Bank 4
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Bank 5 – Stop-sending Minimum Average Maximum
Value of payments initially not submitted
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 4.08% 10.91% 18.35%
Value of rejected payments
(as % of submitted payments) 0.00% 0.45% 4.36%
Value of unsettled payments
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 1.73% 11.77% 23.45%
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 2.66% 17.12% 34.97%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 1.34% 4.79% 11.58%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 0:10:35 0:47:18 1:57:13
Settlement delay 0.01 0.07 0.23
Table 5
Disturbance in the payment system: operational incident at Bank 5
Bank 6 – Stop-sending Minimum Average Maximum
Value of payments initially not submitted
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 4.33% 7.99% 14.37%
Value of rejected payments
(as % of submitted payments) 0.00% 0.24% 2.15%
Value of unsettled payments
(as % of the benchmark scenario) 4.28% 8.48% 16.74%
Total value of queued transactions
(as % of submitted payments) 0.91% 18.04% 33.66%
Maximum queue value
(as % of submitted payments) 0.46% 4.93% 11.15%
Average queue length (hh:mm:ss) 0:08:04 0:45:23 2:11:15
Settlement delay 0.01 0.07 0.21
Table 6
Disturbance in the payment system: operational incident at Bank 6
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